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Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015

Conditions of service and compensation for officials other than Secretariat officials: members of the International Court of Justice and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in paragraph 10 of its resolution 65/258, decided to re-establish a three-year cycle for the review of the conditions of service and compensation for the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, and to undertake the next comprehensive review at its sixty-eighth session. In addition, by its decision 66/556 B of 9 April 2012, the General Assembly deferred until the sixty-eighth session its consideration of the recommendations on the pension schemes for the members of the Court and the judges of the Tribunals, as proposed in reports of the Secretary-General (A/66/617) and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/66/709) and in a letter from the President of the International Court of Justice addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/66/726).

2. In order to facilitate consideration of the variety of issues to be reviewed, the report is presented as follows: section II is devoted to the remuneration of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; section III focuses on the other conditions of service of those

* A/68/150.



individuals; section IV contains an analysis of the review and the Secretary-General's recommendations; section V indicates the financial implications in respect of those recommendations; and section VI refers to the next comprehensive review.

II. Remuneration

A. International Court of Justice

3. Article 32 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides, *inter alia*, that each member of the Court shall receive an annual salary (para. 1), and that the salaries and allowances shall be fixed by the General Assembly and may not be decreased during the term of office (para. 5).

4. The emoluments of the members of the Court are *sui generis*. However, on the occasion of the periodic comprehensive reviews of the emoluments and conditions of service of the members of the Court, information on the net remuneration of senior Secretariat officials, the Chair of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, the Chair and Vice-Chair of the International Civil Service Commission and the members of the Joint Inspection Unit has been provided as a reference point for purposes of comparative assessment. Annex I to the present report illustrates the evolution of emoluments from 2005 to 2013 and compares them with the changes in the remuneration of senior Secretariat officials and that of full-time members of subsidiary bodies of the United Nations. To facilitate comparison, annex II contains a summary of the salaries of an Under-Secretary-General serving in The Hague, the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the International Criminal Court in euros and the equivalent in United States dollars at the official United Nations operational rate of exchange for the month concerned.

B. Ad hoc judges of the International Court of Justice

5. Under Article 31 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, persons chosen by parties to cases before the Court to "take part in the decision on terms of complete equality with their colleagues" (para. 6) are known as *ad hoc* judges. Under Article 32, paragraph 4, of the Statute, they "shall receive compensation for each day on which they exercise their functions". The compensation of the *ad hoc* judges was first defined at the time when the original remuneration system of the Permanent Court of International Justice (the predecessor of the International Court of Justice) was established, back in 1922; it was then composed of two elements described as a "fee" and a "subsistence payment" and applied *pro rata* to the days when service was provided to the Court. In order to maintain the requirement of "complete equality" expressed in paragraph 6 of article 31 (as quoted above), with regard to variances created by the "subsistence payment" element and the *ad hoc* judges' place of residence, the General Assembly decided, in 1980 (resolution 35/220) and in 1985 (resolution 40/257), to redefine the compensation package of the judges of the Court.

6. The Secretary-General recalled that, for the purpose of payments to *ad hoc* judges, annual salary had been last defined in paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 40/257 as follows: *ad hoc* judges were to be compensated for each day

they exercised their functions, one three-hundred-and-sixty-fifth of the sum of the annual base salary and interim cost-of-living supplement payable at the time to a member of the Court (A/61/554, para. 84). Under this definition, the post adjustment system introduced in paragraph 7 of Assembly resolution 61/262 also applies to ad hoc judges.

7. Additional details on the historical background of the determination for the amount of the compensation of the ad hoc judges were presented in the report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its fortieth session (A/C.5/40/32, paras. 35-41).

C. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

8. By its resolution 827 (1993), the Security Council¹ decided to establish the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and adopt its statute. Article 13, paragraph 3, of the statute provides that the terms and conditions of service of its judges shall be as they are for the judges of the International Court of Justice. By its resolution 955 (1994), the Security Council decided to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and adopted its statute. Article 12, paragraph 5, of the statute provides that the terms and conditions of service of its judges shall be the same as those of the judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

D. Ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

9. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council decided, by resolution 1329 (2000), to establish a pool of ad litem judges in the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

10. In its resolution 55/249, the General Assembly endorsed the observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee (see A/55/806, paras. 7-15) on the emoluments for and other conditions of service of the ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, indicating that the annual salary of those individuals should be prorated for length of service.

11. In its resolution 1431 (2002), the Security Council decided to establish a pool of ad litem judges in International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. In his report (A/57/587), the Secretary-General proposed to establish conditions of service applicable to the ad litem judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda based on the provisions of General Assembly resolution 56/285, concerning the emoluments and other conditions of service of the members of the International Court of Justice, the judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

12. In its resolution 57/289, the General Assembly endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the Advisory Committee (A/57/593, para. 23) on the conditions of service for the ad litem judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, which are the same as those applied to the ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

E. International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

13. The International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals was established by the Security Council on 22 December 2010 (resolution 1966 (2010)) to carry out a number of essential functions of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia after the completion of their respective mandates. The branch of the Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda commenced functioning on 1 July 2012 and the one for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, on 1 July 2013.

14. The Security Council, in its resolution 1966 (2010), requested the two Tribunals to take all possible measures to expeditiously complete all their remaining work, as provided in the resolution, no later than 31 December 2014, to prepare their closure and to ensure a smooth transition to the Mechanism, including through advance teams in each of the Tribunals. Annexes 1 and 2 to the resolution contain the statute of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals and the Transitional arrangements for the Tribunals. Article 8 of the statute of the Mechanism stipulates that the terms and conditions of service of the judges for each day on which they exercise their functions for the Mechanism shall be those of the ad hoc judges of the International Court of Justice. The terms and conditions of service of the President of the Mechanism shall be those of the judges of the International Court of Justice. In the event that the President of the Mechanism were to be elected from among the existing permanent judges of the Tribunals and were to be permitted to maintain his or her existing contractual relationship with the United Nations, his or her original conditions of service would continue to apply (A/66/709, para. 17). It should be noted that the current President of the Mechanism is also the President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

15. The judges of the Mechanism will not receive any remuneration or benefits for being on the roster but only after they are appointed to exercise their functions within the Mechanism. For every trial and referral within the jurisdiction of the Mechanism, except for the cases of contempt, the President will appoint three judges from the roster to compose a Trial Chamber. In all other circumstances, the President shall appoint a single judge from the roster.

F. Common historical background

16. The General Assembly has conducted periodic reviews of the emoluments of the members and ad hoc judges of the International Court of Justice and the judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the most recent comprehensive review having been undertaken at its sixty-fifth session (see A/65/134 and Corr.1), as requested by the Assembly in section I, paragraph 8, of its resolution 63/259.

17. In paragraph 6 of its resolution 61/262, the General Assembly endorsed the proposal of the Secretary-General contained in his report of 2 November 2006 (A/61/554, para. 80), whereby the annual salaries of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges and ad litem judges of the two Tribunals would comprise an annual base salary with a corresponding post adjustment per index point equal to 1 per cent of the net base salary, to which would

be applied a post adjustment multiplier for the Netherlands or for the United Republic of Tanzania, as appropriate.

18. The Secretary-General had also proposed that, on the occasion of future revisions to the base salary scale applicable to staff in the Professional and higher categories that are effected through the consolidation of post adjustment multiplier points into the base scale with a corresponding readjustment in the post adjustment multipliers, the annual base salary of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges and ad litem judges of the Tribunals also be adjusted by the same percentage and at the same time (A/61/554, para. 83).

19. As a result of the action taken by the General Assembly, after the last comprehensive review of this agenda item, in its resolutions 65/648 and 66/235 regarding a revised scale of gross and net salaries for staff in the Professional and higher categories, the annual base salary applicable to the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the two Tribunals was revised, in United States dollars, from \$166,595 to \$168,878, effective 1 January 2011, and from \$168,878 to \$169,098, effective 1 January 2012.

20. For comparison purposes, table 1 below sets out the salaries, including post adjustment, of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of Tribunals serving in The Hague, in euros and the equivalent in United States dollars at the official United Nations operational rate of exchange for the month concerned, as well as the salaries of the judges serving in Arusha, expressed in United States dollars.

Table 1

Salaries (including post adjustment) of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda serving in The Hague, expressed in euros and the equivalent in United States dollars, and salaries of the judges serving in Arusha, expressed in United States dollars, for the period from January 2011 to June 2013

<i>Month and year</i>	<i>Judges serving in The Hague (Euros)</i>	<i>Judges serving in The Hague (United States dollars)</i>	<i>Judges serving in Arusha (United States dollars)</i>
January 2011	15 915	20 913	19 266
February 2011	15 846	21 588	19 266
March 2011	15 839	21 757	19 238
April 2011	15 797	22 250	19 238
May 2011	15 237	22 573	19 238
June 2011	15 777	22 475	20 533
July 2011	15 779	22 573	20 448
August 2011	15 752	22 703	20 448
September 2011	15 163	22 039	20 448
October 2011	16 072	21 926	20 448
November 2011	15 541	21 982	20 786

<i>Month and year</i>	<i>Judges serving in The Hague (Euros)</i>	<i>Judges serving in The Hague (United States dollars)</i>	<i>Judges serving in Arusha (United States dollars)</i>
December 2011	16 107	21 476	20 786
Total, 2011	188 825	264 055	240 145
January 2012	16 458	21 264	20 785
February 2012	16 440	21 546	20 785
March 2012	16 399	21 983	21 067
April 2012	16 415	21 800	21 067
May 2012	16 416	21 743	21 067
June 2012	16 528	20 531	21 067
July 2012	16 519	20 545	21 335
August 2012	16 547	20 278	21 335
September 2012	16 509	20 715	21 335
October 2012	16 467	21 194	21 335
November 2012	16 459	21 320	21 335
December 2012	16 449	21 363	21 335
Total, 2012	197 607	254 281	253 844
January 2013	16 522	21 912	21 335
February 2013	16 482	22 363	21 335
March 2013	16 375	21 433	21 518
April 2013	16 584	21 180	21 518
May 2013	16 547	21 659	21 518
June 2013	16 547	21 574	21 518

III. Other conditions of service

21. The other conditions of service of the members of the International Court of Justice include the special allowance for the President and of the Vice-President when acting as President, the compensation of ad hoc judges, education allowance, survivors' benefits, travel and subsistence regulations and retirement benefits (see annex III).

22. The background of other conditions of service of the members of the Court is provided in the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth session.¹

23. In section VIII, paragraph 4, of its resolution 53/214, the General Assembly approved the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on, inter alia, the other conditions of service of the judges of the Tribunals. The background on other

¹ See A/C.5/48/66, paragraphs 16 to 21, on special allowances of the President and of the Vice-President when acting as President, paragraphs 22 and 23 on compensation of ad hoc judges, and paragraphs 24 to 31 on costs of educating children.

conditions of service of the judges of the Tribunals is provided in the report of the Secretary-General to the Assembly at its fifty-second session (A/52/520, paras. 19-21). These other conditions of service include the special allowance of the President and of the Vice-President when acting as President, the education allowance, survivors' benefits, travel and subsistence regulations and retirement benefits (see annex III).

24. In its resolution 56/285, the General Assembly endorsed the recommendations and observations of the Advisory Committee (A/56/7/Add.2, para. 8) on the other conditions of service, in which it reiterated its view that the members of the International Court of Justice should cover the total cost of their participation in the health insurance plans and that the Organization should not have to contribute at all to the cost of their participation.

A. Special allowance of the President and of the Vice-President when acting as President

International Court of Justice

25. Article 32 of the Statute of the Court provides that the President shall receive a special annual allowance (para. 2) and that the Vice-President shall receive a special allowance for each day on which he acts as President (para. 3). As is the case with remuneration, these allowances "shall be fixed by the General Assembly" and "may not be decreased during the term of office" (para. 5).

26. In its resolution 65/258, the General Assembly, noting that the workload of the President of the Court, and that of the Vice-President when acting as President, had increased since 1987 (the last time the allowance was adjusted), decided to increase their special allowance from US\$ 15,000 to US\$ 25,000 per year and from US\$ 94 to US\$ 156 per day, respectively.

International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

27. The amounts of the special allowance for the Presidents of the Tribunals, and the special allowance for the Vice-Presidents of the Tribunals when acting as President, are the same as those established for the President and the Vice-President of the International Court of Justice.

B. Assistance with education costs

28. The General Assembly, in paragraph 12 of its resolution 61/262, decided to extend its decision on the level of education grant for the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the two Tribunals. The International Civil Service Commission last reviewed the level of the education grant in 2012 (see A/67/30).

29. The background information on the genesis and evolution of the issue of assistance with education costs for members of the International Court of Justice and judges of the Tribunals is provided in reports of the Secretary-General

submitted to the General Assembly at its forty-eighth (A/C.5/48/66, paras. 24-29) and sixty-fifth (A/65/134, paras. 19-20 and 74-79) sessions.

30. In his last review (A/65/134, para. 79), the Secretary-General proposed to extend the education allowance entitlement to the eligible *ad litem* judges who have served for a continuous period of more than three years. The General Assembly, however, in its resolution 65/258, endorsed the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/65/533, para. 40) which declined this proposal, arguing that the terms of the letters of appointment signed by *ad litem* judges of both Tribunals remain binding, meaning that the extension of the terms of office of the *ad litem* judges does not give rise to any additional entitlements or benefits other than those which already exist.

31. The *ad litem* judges of the Tribunals do not get assistance with education costs.

C. Survivors' benefit

32. Concerning the establishment of a survivors' lump-sum benefit in the event of the death of serving members of the International Court of Justice, the General Assembly, in its resolution 40/257 C, approved the recommendation of the Advisory Committee to establish, in addition to the existing pension scheme, a death-benefit scheme for the members of the International Court of Justice. Under the provisions adopted by the Assembly, survivors of members of the Court who die while in office are compensated in the form of a lump-sum payment equivalent to one month of salary for each year of service, subject to a minimum of three months and a maximum of nine months of salary. This lump-sum benefit is distinct from the applicable survivors' pension benefits.

33. Concerning the establishment of a survivors' lump-sum benefit in the event of the death of serving judges of the Tribunals, based on its consideration of the note by the Secretary-General (A/C.5/54/30), the General Assembly, in paragraph 7 of its resolution 54/240 A, approved the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and established a lump-sum benefit whereby survivors of the judges would be compensated in the form of a lump-sum equivalent to one month of base salary for each year of service, subject to a minimum of one month and a maximum of four months. This lump-sum benefit is distinct from the applicable survivors' pension benefits.

D. Travel and subsistence regulations

34. In its resolution 37/240, the General Assembly approved the travel and subsistence regulations of the International Court of Justice. In section VIII, paragraph 5, of its resolution 53/214, the Assembly also approved the travel and subsistence regulations for the judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda contained in annex III to the report of the Secretary-General (A/52/520).

35. More background information on the issues of travel and subsistence allowances for members of the International Court of Justice and judges of the two Tribunals is provided in the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session (A/65/134, paras. 26-28, 80 and 81).

E. Relocation allowance

36. The background information on the genesis and evolution of the relocation allowance payable to members of the International Court of Justice and judges of the two Tribunals is provided in the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session (A/65/134 and Corr.1).

37. In its resolution 65/258, the General Assembly decided that the relocation allowance benefit received by the judges of the two Tribunals should be the same as that received by the members of the International Court of Justice.

38. Ad litem judges of the Tribunals are not eligible for a relocation allowance.

F. Issues related to the hardship classification of the duty station

39. In its report of 6 December 2001 (A/56/7/Add.2, para. 9), the Advisory Committee indicated that it had "no objection to the proposed change in the home leave travel of the judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to take account of the hardship classification of the duty station". In its resolution 56/285, the General Assembly endorsed that recommendation.

40. More background information on the issues related to the hardship classification of the duty station is provided in the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-fifth session (A/65/134, paras. 31-33).

G. Retirement benefits

41. The General Assembly, in paragraph 5 of its resolution 65/258, decided to review at its sixty-sixth session the pension schemes for the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the two Tribunals. The Assembly also stipulated that options for defined-benefit and defined-contribution pension schemes should be included in the review, as well as a proposal for a mechanism that might be used to determine retirement pension benefits, taking into account acquired pension benefit rights accrued prior to serving in the Court or the Tribunals. The Secretary-General, in compliance with the foregoing request, submitted his report to the Assembly on 16 December 2011 (A/66/617).

42. In the above-mentioned report, the Secretary-General proposed four design options for pension scheme: defined-benefit, defined-contribution, cash lump-sum through hybrid defined-benefit/defined-contribution, and a two-tiered system of accumulation (the pension scheme currently applied to the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the two Tribunals). Based on the actuarial findings of the review, the Secretary-General identified the defined-benefit scheme to be an appropriate retirement benefit scheme for the new members of the Court and for any new judges of the Tribunals. The most favoured application of this scheme would be a linear system of accumulation of 3.7 per cent per year for 18 years of service and nothing thereafter. It was found that this linear approach would bring down the current actuarial cost of the pension entitlement from around 66 per cent to 44 per cent of the judges' base salary. The comments and concerns of the Court regarding the compatibility with its Statute of certain aspects of the proposal were brought to the attention of the President of the General Assembly in a letter

dated 1 February 2012 from the President of the International Court of Justice (A/66/726).

43. In its decision 66/556 B, the General Assembly deferred until the sixty-eighth session its consideration of the recommendations on the pension schemes for the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the two Tribunals, as proposed in reports of the Secretary-General (A/66/617) and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/66/709), and in the letter from the President of the International Court of Justice addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/66/726).

H. Ad litem judges

44. The background information on the genesis and evolution of the status of ad litem judges of the Tribunals and their conditions of service is provided in the reports of the Secretary-General submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth (A/64/635 and Corr.1) and sixty-fifth (A/65/134 and Corr.1) sessions.

45. In its resolution 64/261, the General Assembly decided that the matter of the difference in pension rights between ad litem judges and permanent judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia should be resolved as a priority of the Assembly at the main part of its sixty-fifth session, and requested the Secretary-General to include a comprehensive actuarial study of the cost of extending pensions to the ad litem judges of the two Tribunals in his report requested pursuant to section I, paragraph 8, of Assembly resolution 63/259.

46. In its resolution 65/258, the General Assembly decided to grant a one-time ex gratia payment upon completion of service for ad litem judges of the Tribunals who have served for a continuous period of more than three years, on the basis of the length of time served exceeding those three years, in accordance with the schedule contained in table 2 below.

Table 2

One-time ex gratia payment schedule for ad litem judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

<i>Term of service (years)</i>	<i>Months of salary</i>
< 3.....	0.000000
4.....	2.054112
5.....	4.108225
6.....	6.162337
7.....	8.216449
8.....	10.270562

Note: Payment is prorated by number of months.

IV. Review and recommendations

A. Remuneration

47. The Secretary-General proposes that no change be effected in the current remuneration system of members of the International Court of Justice and judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the occasion of the present periodic review.

B. Other conditions of service

Special allowance of the Presidents and of the Vice-Presidents when acting as President

48. The Secretary-General proposes that no change be effected in the special annual allowance of the Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the occasion of this periodic review.

Education costs

49. The Secretary-General proposes that no change be effected with the assistance of education costs for the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the occasion of this periodic review.

Travel and subsistence regulations

50. The Secretary-General proposes that no change be effected in the travel and subsistence regulations in respect of members of the International Court of Justice and the judges and ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the occasion of this periodic review.

Relocation allowance

51. The Secretary-General proposes that no change be effected in the relocation allowance of the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals on the occasion of this periodic review.

Retirement benefits

52. The documents referred to in section III, subsection G, of the present report provide the necessary information regarding this item.

V. Financial implications

53. Should the General Assembly approve the recommendation of status quo for the elements contained in paragraphs 47 to 51 above relating to remuneration, the special allowance of the Presidents and of the Vice-Presidents when acting as President, education costs, travel and subsistence regulations and the relocation allowance, the standards for the costing of these items in the proposed budget for the biennium 2014-2015 would remain at the level of the revised 2012-2013 appropriation and would not entail additional resources requirements.

54. The financial implications regarding the proposals of the Secretary-General on a pension scheme for the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges of the two Tribunals are described in his report of 16 December 2011 (A/66/617, paras. 56-61).

VI. Next comprehensive review

55. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 65/258, the General Assembly decided to re-establish a three-year cycle for the review of the conditions of service and compensation for the members of the International Court of Justice and the judges and ad litem judges of the two Tribunals. The next comprehensive review will be undertaken at the seventy-first session of the Assembly.

Annex I

Changes in total annual net remuneration of members of the International Court of Justice, Secretariat officials and members of United Nations bodies, from January 2005 to January 2013

(in United States dollars, dependency rate)^a

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
International Court of Justice									
President ^{b,c}	185 080	185 080	215 651	271 434	263 180	283 386	275 953	280 169	287 947
Index	100.0	100.0	116.5	146.7	142.2	153.1	149.1	151.4	155.6
Members of the Court ^c	170 080	170 080	200 651	256 434	248 180	268 386	250 953	255 169	262 947
Index	100	100.0	118.0	150.8	145.9	157.8	147.5	150.0	154.6
Senior Secretariat officials									
The Hague									
Under-Secretary-General ^d	202 737	182 902	205 128	225 465	218 337	235 787	220 739	224 380	231 098
Index	100	88.9	99.7	109.6	106.1	114.6	107.3	109.0	112.3
Assistant Secretary-General ^e	185 280	167 087	187 474	206 127	199 589	215 594	201 791	205 131	211 292
Index	100	88.8	99.7	109.6	106.1	114.6	107.3	109.1	112.3
Geneva									
Under-Secretary-General ^d	228 331	207 472	223 863	250 299	245 844	267 441	289 436	290 976	300 907
Index	100	100.8	108.8	121.6	119.5	129.9	140.6	141.4	146.2
Assistant Secretary-General ^e	208 755	189 623	204 657	228 905	224 819	244 626	264 800	266 212	275 320
Index	100	100.8	108.8	121.7	119.5	130.1	140.8	141.5	146.4
New York									
Under-Secretary-General ^d	205 809	217 966	217 975	224 783	239 282	239 241	239 263	245 703	245 703
Index	100	105.9	105.9	109.2	116.3	116.2	116.3	119.4	119.4
Assistant Secretary-General ^e	188 097	199 248	199 256	205 501	218 800	218 761	218 781	224 687	224 687
Index	100	105.9	105.9	109.3	116.3	116.3	116.3	119.5	119.5

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Full-time members of subsidiary bodies									
Chairman, International Civil Service Commission/Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions/	189 077	196 240	199 965	207 564	211 515	215 545	217 609	224 833	225 162
Index	100	103.8	105.8	109.8	111.9	114.0	115.1	118.9	119.1
Vice-Chairman, International Civil Service Commission	179 077	186 240	189 965	197 564	201 515	205 545	207 600	214 833	215 162
Index	100	104.0	106.1	110.3	112.5	114.8	115.9	120.0	120.2
Members of the Joint Inspection Unit, Geneva	182 266	165 319	178 637	200 117	196 497	214 044	231 914	233 165	241 234
Index	100	90.7	98.0	109.8	107.8	117.4	127.2	127.9	132.4

^a For the salaries paid in currencies other than United States dollars, the corresponding currency exchange rate of January of each year has been applied in this table.

^b Includes a special allowance of US\$ 15,000 a year from 2005 to 2010 inclusively and of US\$ 25,000 a year from 2011 and on.

^c In accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/262, effective 1 January 2007, the salary of the members of the International Court of Justice comprises an annual base salary with a corresponding post adjustment per index point equal to 1 per cent of the net base salary to which the post adjustment multiplier for the Netherlands applies.

^d Includes a representation allowance of US\$ 4,000 a year.

^e Includes a representation allowance of US\$ 3,000 a year.

^f Includes a special allowance of US\$ 10,000 a year.

Annex II

Salaries for senior officials in The Hague^a

	<i>Under-Secretary-General^b</i>		<i>Judge of the International Court of Justice</i>		<i>Judge of the International Criminal Court</i>	
	<i>Euros</i>	<i>United States dollars</i>	<i>Euros</i>	<i>United States dollars</i>	<i>Euros</i>	<i>United States dollars</i>
January 2011	13 999	18 395	15 915	20 913	15 000	19 711
February 2011	13 930	18 978	15 846	21 588	15 000	20 436
March 2011	13 922	19 124	15 839	21 757	15 000	20 604
April 2011	13 880	19 550	15 797	22 250	15 000	21 127
May 2011	13 385	19 829	15 237	22 573	15 000	22 222
June 2011	13 860	19 744	15 777	22 475	15 000	21 368
July 2011	13 861	19 829	15 779	22 573	15 000	21 459
August 2011	13 838	19 768	15 752	22 503	15 000	21 429
September 2011	13 325	19 367	15 163	22 039	15 000	21 802
October 2011	14 125	19 270	16 072	21 926	15 000	20 464
November 2011	13 658	19 319	15 541	21 982	15 000	21 216
December 2011	14 161	18 881	16 107	21 476	15 000	20 000
	165 943	232 055	188 825	264 055	180 000	251 838
January 2012	14 473	18 698	16 458	21 264	15 000	19 380
February 2012	14 453	18 942	16 440	21 546	15 000	19 659
March 2012	14 412	19 319	16 399	21 983	15 000	20 107
April 2012	14 428	19 161	16 415	21 800	15 000	19 920
May 2012	14 430	19 112	16 416	21 743	15 000	19 868
June 2012	14 543	18 066	16 528	20 531	15 000	18 634
July 2012	14 534	18 078	16 519	20 545	15 000	18 657
August 2012	14 563	17 846	16 547	20 278	15 000	18 382
September 2012	14 524	18 224	16 509	20 715	15 000	18 821
October 2012	14 481	18 638	16 467	21 194	15 000	19 305
November 2012	14 473	18 747	16 459	21 320	15 000	19 430
December 2012	14 463	18 784	16 449	21 363	15 000	19 481
	173 777	223 614	197 607	254 281	180 000	231 643
January 2013	14 521	19 258	16 522	21 912	15 000	19 894
February 2013	14 480	19 648	16 482	22 363	15 000	20 353
March 2013	14 397	18 844	16 375	21 433	15 000	19 634
April 2013	14 584	18 625	16 584	21 180	15 000	19 157
May 2013	14 546	19 039	16 547	21 659	15 000	19 634
June 2013	14 547	18 966	16 547	21 574	15 000	19 557

^a Total net salaries: base salaries and post adjustment.^b At the dependent rate and includes a representation allowance of US\$ 4,000 per year.

Conditions of service and compensation for the members and the ad hoc judges of the International Court of Justice; for the judges and the ad litem judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and for the permanent members and the judges of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

	International Court of Justice		International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda		International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	
	members	ad hoc judges	judges	ad litem judges	President [member]	judges
Annual net salaries [as of January 2013]	US\$ 262,947 per annum, including post adjustment [January 2013 post adjustment multiplier for the Netherlands = 55.5]	1/365 of annual net salary per day worked	US\$ 256,014 (Arusha)/ US\$ 262,947 (The Hague) per annum, including post adjustment [January 2013 post adjustment multipliers = respectively, 51.4 and 55.5]	Same as permanent judges	US\$ 262,947 per annum, including post adjustment [January 2013 post adjustment multiplier for the Netherlands = 55.5]	1/365 of annual net salary per day worked
Special allowance	President: \$25,000 per annum Vice-President (when acting as President): \$156 per day	Not applicable	President: \$25,000 per annum Vice-President (when acting as President): \$156 per day	Not applicable	President: \$25,000 per annum	Not applicable
Travel expenses	For resident judges: Journey for judge, spouse, recognized dependant(s) upon appointment and termination to/from the seat of the Court from/to home established at time of appointment. Return journey for judge, installed spouse, recognized dependant(s) every second calendar year. For non-resident judges: A maximum of three return journeys for judge and one close relative residing with him/her every year, from his/her home at the time of appointment to the seat of the Court to attend	Return journey of any ad hoc judge, and one close relative residing with him/her, from his/her home to the seat of the Court or the place where the session is held, when the ad hoc judge is certified by the Court as necessary for official business.	Journey for judge, spouse, recognized dependant(s) upon appointment and termination to/from the seat of the Tribunals from/to home established at time of appointment. Return journey for judge, installed spouse, recognized dependant(s) every second calendar year. Cost of excess baggage not allowable as an expense unless the excess is necessarily carried for official business reasons.	Same as permanent judges	Journey for the President, spouse, recognized dependant(s) upon appointment and termination to/from the seat of the Tribunal from/to home established at time of appointment. Return journey for the President, installed spouse, recognized dependant(s) every second calendar year. Cost of excess baggage not allowable as an expense unless the excess is necessarily carried for official business reasons.	Return journey of any ad hoc judge, and one close relative residing with him/her from his/her home to the seat of the Court or the place where the session is held, when the presence of the ad hoc judge is certified by the President of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals as necessary for

	International Court of Justice		International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda		International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	
	members	ad hoc judges	judges	ad litem judges	President (member)	judges
	sessions of the Court. For all judges: Cost of excess baggage not allowable as an expense unless the excess is necessarily carried for official business reasons.					
Subsistence allowance	Payable under the conditions of standard rates applied to officials of the United Nations Secretariat plus 40 per cent	Not applicable	Payable under the conditions of standard rates applied to officials of the United Nations Secretariat plus 40 per cent	Same as permanent judges	Payable under the conditions of standard rates applied to officials of the United Nations Secretariat plus 40 per cent	Not applicable
Removal expenses	For resident judges: Full removal of household goods and personal effects. For non-resident judges: partial removal upon approval of the President of the Court	Not applicable	Full removal of household goods and personal effects. Non-removal not convertible to higher lump-sum benefit (eligible to opt for relocation grant \$10,000 or \$15,000)	Same as permanent judges	Full removal of household goods and personal effects	Not applicable
Assignment grant	For resident judges: Amount applicable to senior officials of the United Nations. For non-resident judges: up to one half of the amount applicable to senior officials of the United Nations, upon approval of the President of the Court.	Not applicable	Amount applicable to senior officials of the United Nations	Same as permanent judges	Amount applicable to senior officials of the United Nations	Not applicable

official business.

	International Court of Justice		International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda		International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	
	members	ad hoc judges	Judges	ad litem judges	President [member]	judges
Relocation allowance	For resident judges: 24 weeks of annual net base salary (for nine continuous years of service or more) or 18 weeks of annual net base salary (for more than five but less than nine continuous years of service), payable upon completion of service and resettlement outside the Netherlands. For less than five continuous years of service, a lump sum prorated on the basis of the ceiling of 18 weeks of annual net base salary. Entitlement not applicable to non-resident judges.	Not applicable	Same as the members of the International Court of Justice	Not applicable	24 weeks of annual net base salary (for nine continuous years of service or more) or 18 weeks of annual net base salary (for more than five but less than nine continuous years of service), payable upon completion of service and resettlement outside the Netherlands. For less than five continuous years of service, a lump sum prorated on the basis of the ceiling of 18 weeks of annual net base salary.	Not applicable
Pension	Normal retirement age is 60. The amount of retirement benefit is 50 per cent of judge's annual net base salary (excluding post adjustment) prorated for less than 9 years of service (or approximately 0.468 per cent times net base salary for each of the first 108 completed months) plus 0.154 per cent net base salary for each additional month of service in excess of 108. Maximum 66.67 per cent of final salary. (Minimum of 3 years' service).	Not applicable	Same as members of International Court of Justice, prorated to account for difference in length in terms of appointment (i.e., 9 years for the Court, 4 years for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia/International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) (Minimum of 3 years' service)	One-time ex gratia payment upon completion of service, when applicable	Same as members of International Court of Justice, prorated to account for difference in length in terms of appointment (i.e., 9 years for the Court, 4 years for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia/International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda) (Minimum of 3 years' service). If the President were to be elected from among the existing permanent judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal	Not applicable

	International Court of Justice		International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia		International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals	
	members	ad hoc judges	Judges	ad litem judges	President (member)	judges
Survivor's benefit	50 per cent of pension benefit or lump sum of twice pension benefit as final settlement	Not applicable	50 per cent of pension benefit or lump sum of twice pension benefit as final settlement	Not applicable	Tribunal for Rwanda and were permitted to maintain his/her existing contractual relationship with the United Nations, his/her original conditions of service would continue to apply. Therefore, pursuant to Article 32, paragraph 5, of the Statute of the Court, any changes to the pension scheme that would lead to a decrease in pension benefits would not apply.	Not applicable
Education grant	For resident judges: actual cost of educating their children up to the levels applicable to United Nations staff. Not applicable to non-resident judges.	Not applicable	Applicable under the same rules and regulations governing United Nations staff	Not applicable	Actual cost of educating his/her children up to the levels applicable to United Nations staff.	Not applicable
Disability	Payment of salary during period of ill-health or disability that would prevent a member from performing his/her duty during the service period. No liability beyond that point.	Not applicable	Payment of salary during period of ill-health or disability that would prevent a judge from performing his/her duty during the service period. No liability beyond that point.	Same as permanent judges	Payment of salary during period of ill-health or disability that would prevent the President from performing his/her duty during the service period. No liability beyond that point.	Not applicable



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General and complete disarmament: transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities

Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities. The Group was established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/68.

* A/68/150.



Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities

Summary

The present report contains the study on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures conducted by the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, which was established by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The study was adopted by consensus. The Group concluded that the world's growing dependence on space-based systems and technologies and the information they provide requires collaborative efforts to address threats to the sustainability and security of outer space activities. Transparency and confidence-building measures can reduce, or even eliminate, misunderstandings, mistrust and miscalculations with regard to the activities and intentions of States in outer space.

The Group acknowledged that the existing treaties on outer space contain several transparency and confidence-building measures of a mandatory nature. Non-legally binding measures for outer space activities should complement the existing international legal framework pertaining to space activities and should not undermine existing legal obligations or hamper the lawful use of outer space, particularly by emerging space actors. The Group further agreed that such measures for outer space activities could contribute to, but not act as a substitute for, measures to monitor the implementation of arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

After extensive and in-depth discussions, the Group drafted a series of measures for outer space activities, including exchange of information relating to national space policy such as major military expenditure on outer space, notifications on outer space activities aimed at risk reduction, and visits to space launch sites and facilities. The Group discussed criteria for developing transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities and for testing their implementation and validation. In addition, the Group encouraged further development of international cooperation between spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations in the peaceful uses of outer space for the benefit of all States.

The proposed measures drafted by the Group also include coordination and consultative mechanisms aimed at improving interaction between participants in outer space activities and clarifying information and ambiguous situations. In order to promote effective implementation of the transparency and confidence-building measures, the Group recommended that coordination be established between the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Office for Outer Space Affairs of the Secretariat.

The Group recommended that States and international organizations consider and implement the transparency and confidence-building measures contained in the present report on a voluntary basis and without prejudice to the implementation of obligations deriving from existing legal commitments.

The Group further recommended that the General Assembly decide how to best advance transparency and confidence-building measures and facilitate their universal consideration and support, including by the relevant offices of the Secretariat and the United Nations entities whose work relates to disarmament. The Group also requested the Secretary-General to circulate its report to all relevant entities of the United Nations system.

Foreword by the Secretary-General

The societies of our globalized world are increasingly dependent on the more than 1,000 operational satellites that orbit Earth. Space-based platforms can collect and almost instantly broadcast large amounts of information worldwide. The benefits derived from outer space resources are now fundamental components of our daily lives. From agriculture and weather forecasting to mapping and communications, space plays an ever-growing role in human activities and development.

However, outer space is a fragile environment where the steps taken by one actor may have an impact on others, including users of space services on Earth. The broader application of space operations and the increased strategic value of space have resulted in a growing focus on safety in outer space activities. Satellites provide strategic advantages but they are also vulnerable. Protecting space assets has thus become a serious international security concern.

The applicability of transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities was explored for the first time at the global level in 1993, when few countries were able to operate satellites and spacecraft. Today, more than 60 States, government consortiums and other entities own or operate space assets, and the number of spacefaring nations continues to grow. This fundamental change in the political climate surrounding outer space led me to establish, in 2012, the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities.

The present report contains the Group's conclusions and recommendations. It builds on the recommendations of a previous group of experts and on proposals for outer space transparency and confidence-building measures submitted to the United Nations by Member States.

The study reaffirms that international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space can help States to develop and strengthen their capacities to benefit from space activities. The Group agreed on a number of substantive transparency and confidence-building measures, which I commend to the General Assembly for consideration. I also support the Group's recommendation to establish coordination between various entities of the United Nations Secretariat and other institutions involved in outer space activities. This would facilitate the implementation of the transparency and confidence-building measures and promote their further development. Outer space is an inherently multilateral domain. If we are to continue to take advantage of the invaluable resources that outer space provides, it is critically important for all nations to work collectively to keep it free from destabilizing conflict and to make it safe, secure and sustainable in the long term for the benefit of all humankind.

Letter of transmittal

19 July 2013

I have the honour to submit herewith the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/68. The members of the Group are as follows:

Brazil

Mr. João Marcelo **Galvão de Queiroz**
Head, Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies Division
Ministry of Foreign Relations
Brasilia

Chile

Mr. Helmut **Lagos**
Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations
Vienna

China

Mr. **Dai Huaicheng**
Director
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Beijing

France

Mr. Gérard **Brachet**
President, Academy of Air and Space
Paris

Italy

Mr. Sergio **Marchisio**
Director
Institute of International Legal Studies
National Research Council
Rome

Kazakhstan

Mr. Ruslan **Amirgereyev**
Head, Military Programmes Ministry of Defence
Astana

Nigeria

Mr. Augustine U. Nwosa
Minister
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations
New York

Republic of Korea

Mr. Chulmin Park
Deputy Director General
International Organizations Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Seoul

Romania

Mr. Dimitru-Dorin Prunariu
President
Scientific Council of the Romanian Space Agency
Bucharest

Russian Federation

Mr. Victor L. Vasiliev
Deputy Permanent Representative
Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations
and other international organizations (Geneva)
Geneva

Sri Lanka

Mr. Musthafa M. Jaffeer
Ambassador of Sri Lanka to Norway
Oslo

Ukraine

Mr. Andrii Kasianov
Counsellor
Division of Disarmament and Non-proliferation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kyiv
(First session)

Mr. Borys Atamanenko
Head
International Relations Department State Space Agency
Kyiv
(Second and third sessions)

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Mr. Richard Crowther
Chief Engineer
United Kingdom Space Agency
Swindon, Wiltshire

United States of America

Mr. Frank A. Rose
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Space and Defence Policy
Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

The report was prepared between July 2012 and July 2013, during which period the Group of Governmental Experts held three sessions: the first and third sessions were held in New York, from 23 to 27 July 2012 and from 8 to 12 July 2013 respectively, and the second session was held in Geneva, from 1 to 5 April 2013.

In carrying out its work, the Group took into account the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space" (A/48/305 and Corr.1). It also considered a number of proposals from experts and from States that were not represented by experts in the Group.

With the purpose of preparing a comprehensive study, the Group authorized the Chair to conduct consultations during the intersessional periods with intergovernmental organizations involved in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. The Chair briefed the Conference on Disarmament and the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space about discussions within the Group. In addition, he conducted consultations with the International Telecommunication Union and the World Meteorological Organization.

Following extensive and in-depth discussions, the experts agreed upon a set of transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities and recommended that States consider and implement them on a voluntary basis. The measures include the exchange of different types of information relating to space policy and activities, risk reduction notifications and expert visits to national space facilities.

The Group recommended that the General Assembly decide how to further advance transparency and confidence-building measures and provide for their universal consideration and support. In addition, it requested the Secretary-General to circulate the present report to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and other relevant entities of the United Nations system. Efforts should also be made to reach universal participation in, implementation of and full adherence to the existing legal agreements relating to outer space activities. The Group stressed that the implementation of those international agreements in combination with the transparency and confidence-building measures recommended in the report would constitute an essential element for building a climate of trust and confidence among States.

The members of the Group wish to express their appreciation for the assistance they received from members of the United Nations Secretariat, in particular those who served as Secretaries of the Group. The Group also wishes to express its appreciation for the contribution of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, which served as consultant to the Group.

I have been requested by the Group of Governmental Experts, as its Chair, to submit to you, on its behalf, the present report, which was approved by consensus.

(Signed) Victor L. Vasiliev

Chair

Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and
Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities

I. Introduction

1. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 65/68, the Secretary-General established the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities, on the basis of equitable geographical representation, with the purpose of conducting a study on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures, making use of the relevant reports of the Secretary-General. The General Assembly has noted the need to conduct the study, without prejudice to the substantive discussions on the prevention of an arms race in outer space within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.
2. The present report reflects the recommendations of the Group of Governmental Experts on possible transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities that could be adopted voluntarily by States on a unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral basis. Section II contains background information on the subject and section III contains information on the general characteristics and basic principles of outer space transparency and confidence-building measures. Sections IV-VIII reflect the specific measures recommended by the Group on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities and section IX contains conclusions and recommendations with regard to the implementation of the measures presented in sections IV-VIII.
3. For the preparation of the report, the Group carried out a wide range of consultations and received input from Member States, international organizations and civil society.

II. Background

4. From communications, financial operations, farming, weather forecasting and environmental monitoring to navigation, surveillance and treaty monitoring, outer space resources play a key role in the social, economic, scientific and technological activities of all nations, as well as in the field of international peace and security.
5. Today, there are more than 1,000 operational satellites in orbit around the Earth. More than 60 States, government consortiums and other entities own or operate those space assets and more and more States are becoming spacefaring nations and/or increasing their space-based capabilities and resources.
6. The result of the increase in space actors and space users is that the space environment, especially key Earth orbits, is becoming increasingly congested, contested and competitive. In the context of international peace and security, there is growing concern that threats to vital space capabilities may increase during the next decade as a result of both natural and man-made hazards and the possible development of disruptive and destructive counterspace capabilities.
7. In addition to the growth of space actors and space resource users, since the last study by governmental experts on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space (A/48/305 and Corr.1), the political climate regarding outer space sustainability and security has fundamentally changed, as reflected in, inter alia, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on transparency and confidence-building measures and the substantive discussions of the Conference on Disarmament on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and of the Working

Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as well as the activities of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Various proposals have also been put forward, including a draft treaty on prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects (see CD/1839) and the European Union proposal for an international code of conduct for outer space activities.

8. The Group recognized the invaluable role played by the existing international treaties on outer space, especially the Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in consolidating a legal regime aimed at fostering use of outer space and strengthening international cooperation in outer space activities. In that context, the Group recognized that States are ultimately responsible for the authorization and continuing supervision of all space activities under their jurisdiction. Under the legal framework of those treaties and other instruments that may also be relevant and applicable to the space environment in that context, use of outer space by States, international organizations and private entities has flourished. As a result, space technology and services contribute immeasurably to economic growth and improvements in the quality of life around the world.

9. With regard to maintaining international peace and security, it is clear that it is in the interest of all nations to act responsibly and in accordance with international law when carrying out outer space activities, in order to help to prevent mishaps, misperceptions and miscalculations. As more governmental and non-governmental entities become involved in outer space activities, greater international cooperation is needed to uphold the long-standing principle that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries. Such cooperation is essential if the international community is to succeed in safeguarding the use of outer space for peaceful purposes and for future generations.

10. The Group noted that efforts by States, and the international community as a whole, are being undertaken to advance concerted, well-thought out, effective and timely bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives to strengthen stability and security in outer space in a constructive manner.

11. The work that takes place within the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, its Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and its Legal Subcommittee, makes a significant contribution to the promotion of the long-term sustainability of outer space activities. The Committee and its Subcommittees play a central role in the development of treaties, principles and guidelines related to outer space activities.

12. In 2010, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee established the Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities. The Working Group is mandated to prepare a report on the long-term sustainability of outer space activities and to recommend a set of guidelines focused on practical and prudent measures that could be implemented in a timely manner to enhance the safety and long-term sustainability of outer space activities.

13. The Group of Governmental Experts recognized the active participation of member States of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the development of those guidelines and noted the importance of their subsequent

implementation by all States and intergovernmental organizations. In some respects, the guidelines will be similar to transparency and confidence-building measures and some of the guidelines could be considered as potential transparency and confidence-building measures, while others could provide the technical basis for the implementation of some of the transparency and confidence-building measures proposed by the Group of Governmental Experts. The report of the Working Group on the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities will be presented to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Once the finalized guidelines are approved, they will be presented to the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, and then to the General Assembly itself for endorsement and adoption.

14. The Group noted the extensive work of the First Committee of the General Assembly on confidence-building measures in various sectors. Specifically, the Group noted that the First Committee recommends for adoption by the Assembly a draft resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities on an annual basis. Additionally, the Group noted the concrete proposals from Member States on outer space transparency and confidence-building measures, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities" (A/65/123 and Add.1).

15. The Group noted that the agenda of the sessions of the Conference on Disarmament includes the item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". In that context, several initiatives related to transparency and confidence-building measures have been proposed. They include, for example, working papers from Canada on transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space (CD/1815) and on the merits of certain draft transparency and confidence-building measures and treaty proposals for space security (CD/1865). Also of note is the draft treaty on prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects (see CD/1839).

16. On 5 June 2012, the European Union presented a draft of a non-legally binding international code of conduct for outer space activities to the international community. The Group noted that the first open-ended consultations on the proposal were held in Kyiv on 16 and 17 May 2013.

17. The Group noted the role of ITU in the management of the radio frequency spectrum and geostationary orbital slots. In the context of transparency and confidence-building measures, the ITU Radiocommunication Bureau plays a key role in addressing harmful interference to radio services or communications, as provided for in article 45 of the ITU Constitution and article 15 of the ITU Radio Regulations. The Group also noted the importance of commitments to establish and implement policies and procedures to minimize any form of harmful interference in radio frequencies.

18. The Group noted that regional intergovernmental organizations provide useful platforms for the development and implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures related to coordination and international cooperation.

19. The Group noted that, since 2004, several States have introduced a policy of not being the first State to place weapons in outer space.

III. General characteristics and basic principles

A. Nature and purpose of outer space transparency and confidence-building measures

20. In general terms, transparency and confidence-building measures are a means by which Governments can share information with the aim of creating mutual understanding and trust, reducing misperceptions and miscalculations and thereby helping both to prevent military confrontation and to foster regional and global stability. They also assist in building confidence as to the peaceful intentions of States and can help States to increase understanding, enhance clarity of intentions and create conditions for establishing a predictable strategic situation in both the economic and security fields.

21. Although there is no universal or comprehensive prescription for identifying transparency and confidence-building measures, there are certain characteristics that may be used to determine their effectiveness. In general, there are two types of transparency and confidence-building measures: those dealing with capabilities and those dealing with behaviours. The Group took note of the Guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level, as contained in the study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space (A/48/305 and Corr.1, annex, appendix II).

22. Transparency and confidence-building measures have been employed in a number of terrestrial contexts for decades. They had an especially important role during the cold war, where they were intended to contribute to reducing the risk of armed conflict through mitigating misunderstandings related to military activities, particularly in situations where States lacked clear and timely information.

23. The Group was of the view that transparency and confidence-building measures developed in a multilateral framework are more likely to be adopted by the wider international community.

B. Transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities

24. The Group recognized that transparency and confidence-building measures, for the purpose of its study, should be considered as non-legally binding voluntary measures. At the same time, it noted that elements of transparency and confidence-building measures may be found in existing international agreements. The Group also discussed other measures, including those of a legally binding nature.

25. The Group recognized that the need for transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities has increased significantly over the past two decades. It is generally acknowledged that such measures can augment the safety, sustainability and security of day-to-day space operations and can contribute both to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples. That recognition has been reflected in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly.

26. Transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities are part of a broader context of such measures. The General Assembly endorsed, in its resolution 43/78 H, the guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures, as adopted by the Disarmament Commission at its 1988 substantive session. In that resolution, the Assembly noted that confidence-building measures, while neither a substitute nor a precondition for arms limitation and disarmament measures, can be conducive to achieving progress in disarmament.

27. The Group identified the following transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities as being of relevance:

(a) General transparency and confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing the availability of information on the space policy of States involved in outer space activities;

(b) Information exchange about development programmes for new space systems, as well as information about operational space-based systems providing widely used services such as meteorological observations or global positioning, navigation and timing;

(c) Dissemination of information on a State's principles and goals relating to their exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

(d) Specific information-exchange measures aimed at expanding the availability of information on objects in outer space and their general function, particularly those objects in Earth orbits;

(e) Measures related to establishing norms of behaviour for promoting spaceflight safety such as launch notifications and consultations that aim at avoiding potentially harmful interference, limiting orbital debris and minimizing the risk of collisions with other space objects;

(f) International cooperation measures in outer space activities, including measures aimed at promoting capacity-building and disseminating data for sustainable economic and social development, that are consistent with existing international commitments and obligations.

28. The Group agreed that transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities can also contribute to, but not act as a substitute for, measures to verify arms limitation and disarmament agreements.

29. The Group noted that some transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities have already been enacted at the multilateral and/or the national level. Such measures include pre-launch notifications, space situational awareness data-sharing, notifications of hazards to spaceflight safety and other significant events, and the publication of national space policies. Several countries have also proposed new voluntary unilateral or collective transparency and confidence-building measures in space.

C. Criteria for transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space

30. Transparency and confidence-building measures can be developed and implemented by States and intergovernmental organizations unilaterally, bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally. States should implement such measures to the greatest extent practicable and in a manner consistent with their national interests and obligations. Transparency and confidence-building measures promote mutual confidence among States through constructive dialogue and increased awareness and insight.

31. In general terms, transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities should be aimed at increasing the security, safety and sustainability of outer space. Particular attention should be given to the development and implementation of voluntary and pragmatic measures to ensure the security and stability of all aspects of outer space activities. In developing transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities, it is particularly important to be able to demonstrate the practicability of a particular measure or set of actions to the various actors involved, within the scope of that proposed measure or set of actions.

32. The Group observed that the existing treaties on outer space contain several transparency and confidence-building measures of a mandatory nature. Non-legally binding transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities should complement the existing international legal framework pertaining to outer space activities, and not undermine existing legal obligations or hamper the legal use of outer space, particularly by emerging space actors. Once adopted, transparency and confidence-building measures might have specific effects in a domestic context, especially with regard to their implementation through relevant national mechanisms.

33. Transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities should complement, but not act as a substitute for, the verification measures in arms control agreements and regimes. Voluntary measures could contribute to the consideration of concepts and proposals for legally binding arms control measures as well as verification protocols included in legally binding international instruments.

34. Proposed transparency and confidence-building measures should:

(a) Be clear, practical and proved, meaning that both the application and the efficacy of the proposed measure have been demonstrated by one or more actors;

(b) Reduce or even eliminate the causes of mistrust, misunderstanding and miscalculation with regard to the activities and intentions of States.

35. The table below sets out elements for testing the implementation, validation and demonstration of a transparency and confidence-building measure.

Testing a transparency and confidence-building measure

	<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Demonstration</i>
Who	Who should implement the measure?	Who will be able to confirm that the measure has been implemented?
What	What is the measure that should be implemented? Is it clearly identified and understood?	What should be demonstrated to confirm implementation?
Why	What is the value or benefit of performing the measure?	Does a clear understanding of why it is important to be able to confirm or demonstrate implementation exist?
When	When should the measure be implemented?	When should demonstration or confirmation be performed?
How	How should the measure be implemented?	How is implementation of the measure validated, demonstrated or confirmed?

IV. Enhancing the transparency of outer space activities

36. Regular and routine exchanges of information through bilateral, regional and multilateral mechanisms are intended to serve as opportunities for States to describe their current and planned space activities. States may exchange general information on their outer space policies and space activities and provide risk reduction notifications for foreseeable hazardous situations. Risks may include dangers to the lives or health of astronauts or to human spaceflight activity, as well as natural phenomena that may cause harm to spacecraft. States should be encouraged to share information with other governmental and non-governmental spacecraft operators and relevant international organizations in a timely manner. States may consider undertaking, on a voluntary basis, familiarization visits to space-related facilities.

A. Information exchange on space policies**Principles and goals of a State's outer space policy**

37. States should publish information on their national space policies and strategies, including those relating to security. States should also publish information on their major outer space research and space applications programmes in order to build a climate of trust and confidence between States on military and non-military matters. This should be carried out in line with existing multilateral commitments. States may provide additional information reflecting their relevant defence policy, military strategies and doctrines.

Major military outer space expenditure and other national security space activities

38. Consistent with existing political commitments for national reporting on major military expenditure and guidelines and recommendations for objective information on military matters to all Member States, Governments should use existing mechanisms to report on their military space expenditure as well as other national security space activities. They may supplement such reports with explanatory remarks regarding submitted data to explain or clarify the figures provided in the reports, such as total national security space expenditure as a share of gross domestic product and major changes from previous reports.

B. Information exchange and notifications related to outer space activities

Orbital parameters of outer space objects and potential orbital conjunctions

39. Exchanges of information on the basic orbital parameters of outer space objects may assist in increasing the accuracy of the tracking of space objects. Specific measures could include:

(a) Exchange of information on the orbital elements of space objects and the provision, to the extent practicable, of notifications of potential orbital conjunctions involving spacecraft to relevant government and private sector spacecraft operators;

(b) Provision of registration information to the United Nations as soon as practicable, in accordance with the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space and General Assembly resolution 62/101, entitled "Recommendations on enhancing the practice of States and international intergovernmental organizations in registering space objects";

(c) Provision of public access to national registries of space objects.

Such notifications, through bilateral, regional and multilateral mechanisms, can provide transparency regarding specific space activities. Shared awareness of spaceflight activity may foster global spaceflight safety and avoid mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust.

Natural hazards in outer space

40. In accordance with the Outer Space Treaty, States should immediately inform other States or the Secretary-General of the United Nations of any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could constitute a danger to the life or health of astronauts or to human spaceflight activity. States should also consider providing, on a voluntary basis, timely information to other governmental and non-governmental spacecraft operators of natural phenomena that may cause harm to spacecraft engaged in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

Planned spacecraft launches

41. States should provide pre-launch notifications of space vehicle launches and the mission of launch vehicles. The Group noted that the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation contains an example of such a notification.

C. Risk reduction notifications

Scheduled manoeuvres that may result in risk to the flight safety of other space objects

42. States should notify, in a timely manner and to the greatest extent practicable, States that may be affected by scheduled manoeuvres that may result in risk to the flight safety of the space objects of other States.

Uncontrolled high-risk re-entry events

43. States should support the development and implementation of measures to exchange information with and notify, in a timely manner and to the greatest extent practicable, all States that may be affected by predicted high-risk re-entry events in which the re-entering space object or residual material from the re-entering space object could potentially cause significant damage or radioactive contamination. Such notifications could also be made to the Secretary-General and relevant international organizations.

Emergency situations

44. States should, in a timely manner and to the greatest extent practicable, notify all States that may be affected by events linked to natural and man-made threats to the flight safety of space objects. These may include risks caused by the malfunctioning of space objects or loss of control that could result in a significantly increased probability of a high-risk re-entry event or a collision between space objects.

Intentional orbital break-ups

45. Intentional destruction of any orbiting spacecraft or launch vehicle orbital stages or other harmful activities that generate long-life debris should be avoided. When intentional break-ups are determined to be necessary, States should inform States that may be affected of their plans, including measures that will be taken to ensure intentional destruction is conducted at sufficiently low altitudes to limit the orbital lifetime of resulting fragments. All actions should be carried out in conformity with the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 62/217, entitled "International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space".

D. Contact and visits to space launch sites and facilities

Voluntary familiarization visits

46. Voluntary familiarization visits can provide opportunities to improve international understanding of a State's processes and procedures for space activities, including dual-use and military activities, and can provide context for the development and implementation of notifications and consultations.

Expert visits

47. Taking note of article X of the Outer Space Treaty, as well as other multilateral commitments, the Group encouraged States to consider, on a voluntary basis, honouring requests of experts to visit space facilities, including space launch sites,

and inviting international observers to launch sites, flight command and control centres and other operational facilities of outer space infrastructure, as well as space situational awareness centres.

Demonstrations

48. Demonstrations of rockets and other space-related technologies could be carried out on a voluntary basis and in line with existing multilateral commitments and national export control regulations.

V. International cooperation

49. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space provides a basis for all States to develop and strengthen their capacity to undertake and/or derive benefits from space activities. International cooperation on scientific and technical projects between both spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations can contribute to confidence-building.

50. While there are a number of States that have acquired significant space-related capabilities, many non-spacefaring States have a strong desire to participate directly in outer space activities and to share in space technology.

51. As noted in the study on the application of confidence-building measures in outer space (A/48/305 and Corr.1), the disparity in the space capabilities of States, the inability to participate in space activities without the assistance of others, uncertainty concerning sufficient transfer of space technologies and the inability to acquire significant space-based information are factors in the lack of confidence among States. International cooperation is an important vehicle for promoting the right of each nation to achieve its legitimate objectives of benefiting from space technology for its own development and welfare.

52. The Group further noted that each State is free to determine the nature of its participation in international space cooperation on an equitable and mutually acceptable basis with regard to the legitimate rights and interests of parties' concerns, for example, appropriate technology safeguard arrangements, multilateral commitments and relevant standards and practices.

53. The Group agreed that the Outer Space Treaty should be regarded as a basis for the furthering of international cooperation in outer space activities and, in accordance with article I of the Treaty, that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and should be the province of all humankind.

54. The Group took note of the Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries (General Assembly resolution 51/122, annex) and specifically noted that the Declaration should form a basis for the development of international cooperation in outer space activities. Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Declaration are of particular relevance.

55. Bilateral, regional and multilateral capacity-building programmes on space science and technologies can contribute to developing the space skills and

knowledge of educators and scientists in developing countries throughout the world. Such programmes should build capacity through a focus on theory, research, applications, field exercises and pilot projects in order to advance social and economic development in their target States and regions. The Group noted that there are many regional and multilateral capacity-building programmes already in place. In particular, the United Nations Programme on Space Applications is a well-established capacity-building programme that would benefit from further support from spacefaring countries. Other international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, WMO and ITU contribute specific capacity-building programmes in their respective areas of competence. Capacity-building programmes are also available, in various formats, at the bilateral level. Such programmes are often associated with a specific cooperation agreement.

56. Adoption of an open satellite data-collection and dissemination policy for sustainable economic and social development would be consistent with General Assembly resolution 41/65, entitled "Principles relating to remote sensing of the Earth from outer space". In promoting data dissemination policies, States could also consider establishing programmes aimed at training and educating users in developing countries to receive and interpret relevant satellite-based data and to make such data available, useful and accessible to domestic and international end users. The Group noted that some States already disseminate free remote sensing data for the promotion of economic and social development. The Group also noted that the importance of space-technology-based data, in situ monitoring and reliable geospatial information for sustainable development was recognized in paragraph 274 of the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from 20 to 22 June 2012, entitled "The future we want" (General Assembly resolution 66/288, annex).

VI. Consultative mechanisms

57. Timely and routine consultations through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic exchanges and other government-to-government mechanisms including bilateral, military-to-military, scientific and other channels, can contribute to preventing mishaps, misperceptions and mistrust. They may also be useful in:

- (a) Clarifying information regarding the exploration and use of space, including for national security purposes;
- (b) Clarifying information provided on space research and space applications programmes;
- (c) Clarifying ambiguous situations;
- (d) Discussing the implementation of agreed transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities;
- (e) Discussing the modalities and appropriate international mechanisms for addressing practical aspects of outer space uses;
- (f) Preventing or minimizing potential risks of physical damage or harmful interference.

58. States are encouraged to consider using existing consultative mechanisms, for example those provided for in article IX of the Outer Space Treaty and in the relevant provisions of the ITU Constitution and Radio Regulations.

59. The Group was of the opinion that its establishment, work and consultative function serve as transparency and confidence-building measures in their own right.

VII. Outreach

60. Outreach measures can improve understanding between States as well as regional, multilateral, non-governmental and private sector cooperation. The implementation of political and diplomatic outreach measures relating to outer space activities can help to promote the security of all States by fostering mutual trust. Specific measures may include States' participation in thematic workshops and conferences on space security issues.

61. Spacefaring States should inform the Secretary-General, the general public and the international scientific community of the nature, conduct, locations and results of outer space activities, in accordance with the Outer Space Treaty.

62. The Group noted the important intellectual contribution of international organizations and non-governmental organizations to facilitating outreach activities. Such activities provide an opportunity for all States and other relevant stakeholders to develop constructive dialogue. Within the United Nations system, the work of the Office for Outer Space Affairs, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are of particular note. States should actively encourage all stakeholders, including academia and non-governmental organizations, to actively participate in raising public awareness about outer space policies and activities.

VIII. Coordination

63. States are encouraged, including through national space agencies or other authorized entities, existing mechanisms and international organizations, to promote the coordination of their space policies and space programmes in order to enhance the safety and predictability of the uses of space. In support of that goal they may also conclude bilateral, regional or multilateral arrangements, in accordance with multilateral commitments.

64. The Group considered that coordination among multilateral organizations engaged in developing transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities is essential. Such coordination should be carried out in accordance with the respective mandates of those organizations.

65. The Group agreed that, for the purpose of strengthening coordination in outer space activities, States, international organizations and private sector actors conducting space programmes should establish focal points for coordination.

66. The Group recommended that coordination be established between the Office for Outer Space Affairs, the Office for Disarmament Affairs and other appropriate United Nations entities on matters related to transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities. The Group also considered that a United Nations

inter-agency mechanism could provide a useful platform for the promotion and effective implementation of transparency and confidence-building measures for outer space activities.

67. States should seek to participate, to the maximum extent possible, in the outer space-related activities of intergovernmental entities of the United Nations system, such as the Conference on Disarmament, ITU, WMO, the Commission on Sustainable Development and any of their successor bodies. States conducting space activities should actively participate, as members or observers, in activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

IX. Conclusions and recommendations

68. The Group of Governmental Experts recommends that States and international organizations, on a voluntary basis and without prejudice to the implementation of obligations deriving from existing legal commitments, consider and implement the transparency and confidence-building measures described in the present report.

69. The Group endorses efforts to pursue political commitments, for example in the form of unilateral declarations, bilateral commitments or a multilateral code of conduct, to encourage responsible actions in and the peaceful uses of outer space. The Group concludes that voluntary political measures can form the basis for consideration of concepts and proposals for legally binding obligations.

70. The Group encourages States to review and implement the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures through relevant national mechanisms on a voluntary basis. Such measures should be implemented to the greatest extent practicable and in a manner that is consistent with States' national interests. As specific unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures are agreed to, States should regularly review the implementation of the measures and discuss any additional ones that may be necessary, including those required owing to advances in the development of space technologies and in their application.

71. In order to build confidence and trust among States, the Group recommends universal participation in, implementation of and full adherence to the existing legal framework relating to outer space activities, which includes: the Outer Space Treaty; the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space; the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects; the Registration Convention; the ITU Constitution, Convention and Radio Regulations, as revised; the Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, as amended; the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water; and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. States that have not yet become parties to the international treaties governing the use of outer space should consider ratifying or acceding to those treaties.

72. The Group also recommends that the General Assembly decide how to further advance transparency and confidence-building measures and provide for their universal consideration and support, including by referring the above recommendations to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament for consideration, as appropriate. The First and Fourth Committees of the General Assembly may also

decide to hold a joint ad hoc meeting to address possible challenges to space security and sustainability.

73. The Group further recommends that Member States take measures to implement, to the greatest extent practicable, principles and guidelines endorsed on the basis of consensus by the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the General Assembly. Member States should also consider, where appropriate, taking measures to implement other internationally recognized space-related principles.

74. The Group encourages relevant international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to consider and implement the proposed transparency and confidence-building measures as appropriate and to the greatest extent practicable.

75. The Group recommends that the Secretary-General circulate the present report to all relevant entities and organizations of the United Nations system in order that they may assist in effectively implementing the conclusions and recommendations contained within it.

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Item 21 (e) of the provisional agenda*

Globalization and interdependence**International migration and development****Report of the Secretary-General***Summary*

In resolution 63/225, the General Assembly decided to hold a high-level dialogue on international migration and development during its sixty-eighth session. In resolution 65/170, the Assembly invited relevant organizations to contribute to the report of the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was also requested to report on the effects of migration on economic and social development in countries of origin and destination (A/67/219).

The introduction to the present report provides a broad overview of progress made in addressing migration challenges since 2006, the year of the first High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development. It also proposes some key issues to be taken up by the high-level dialogue to be held in 2013.

Section II summarizes global migration trends based on the latest available evidence, highlights recent migration flows and discusses the role of migration in future population change. Section III discusses multidimensional aspects of migration and development, with a specific focus on the impact of migration on global development.

Section IV presents lessons learned by the United Nations system as well as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in promoting the benefits of migration for social and economic development, providing a coherent inter-agency response to migration and applying relevant international standards and norms.

Section V proposes eight concrete measures for follow-up to the High-level Dialogue.

* A/68/150.



I. Introduction

1. Since 2006, we have made real progress in understanding how the world's 232 million international migrants affect the development of their countries of origin and destination. We have implemented various policies that recognize their contributions and protect them from exploitation. Now it is time to act more systematically and responsibly, ensuring an age- and gender-sensitive and rights-based approach to international migration.
2. We know migration reduces poverty on an extraordinary scale. When they move, some migrants multiply their income and double the school enrolment rates of their children. The monies they send to family members back home help them attend school, pay for medical care and equip houses with water and electricity. Formal remittance flows to developing countries alone grew to \$401 billion last year. Migrants play an important role in the global economy, helping meet critical needs for skills and labour. Destination countries rely on them to fill gaps in the labour market at all levels and to open up new markets.
3. In 2013, nearly every country is affected by migration. No society can consider its future without factoring in the effects of human mobility. Yet too often men and women cannot adequately pursue opportunities for decent work and a better life, the skills and credentials of migrants go unrecognized and companies and households cannot employ the workers they need.
4. Too few channels exist for legal migration. The human rights of migrants, therefore, are compromised. Millions travel, live and work outside the protection of laws. As a result, those who exploit migrants — smugglers and traffickers, unscrupulous recruiters and corrupt employers — are empowered. We must begin building an adaptable system of international migration that responds to the realities of the twenty-first century.
5. Seven years ago, at the first High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, we took the historic step of creating the Global Forum on Migration and Development. Today, the Forum has become indispensable: it attracts more than 150 States annually and fosters a common understanding of migration.
6. Once-divisive topics, such as the human rights of migrants and irregular migration, have become integrated into our discussions. Civil society, too, has contributed to and benefited from the Forum, allowing it to be a more unified and effective force for change.
7. Meanwhile, the Global Migration Group has brought together 15 United Nations entities and the International Organization for Migration to coordinate their migration-related work. Since the first High-level Dialogue, IOM has seen an expansion of its membership, activities and reach, building a stronger partnership with the United Nations entities dealing with migration. In that collaborative environment, the Global Migration Group is building evidence to understand and articulate the links between migration and development, while also promoting international human rights, refugee and labour law standards.
8. More and more, States confront a similar set of challenges; almost all, in fact, are simultaneously countries of origin, transit and destination. Increasingly they understand that overcoming those challenges requires collaboration. Consequently, views have begun to converge, creating greater potential for common action.

9. Meaningful international cooperation is already evident. Remittance fees have been nearly halved. New norms are being established: the Domestic Workers Convention will help protect some of the most vulnerable migrants. Many countries, meanwhile, are beginning to integrate migration into their development strategies.

10. In 2013, the High-level Dialogue must deliberate on an action-oriented agenda to create a safer, more transparent system of international mobility that protects migrant rights, serves shared economic interests, fosters cohesive multicultural societies, addresses public anxieties about migration and views migrants as vital members of our communities.

11. Progress must be made at all levels. A truly dynamic system of human mobility requires policymakers across all sectors of government to work collaboratively to address migration challenges.

12. Equally, migration's development impact must be harnessed. Migration has been instrumental in achieving many of the Millennium Development Goals. Now is the time for Member States to consider making migration and migrants an explicit part of the post-2015 development agenda.

13. The post-2015 agenda also could aim to eliminate discrimination against migrants, particularly with respect to wages and access to education and health care; end the scourge of human trafficking; increase the share of migrants working at the higher skill levels; and lower the proportion of migrants lacking residency rights. In addition, we must strengthen the engagement of diasporas as development partners.

14. There is no single response that will allow us to solve the problems and seize the opportunities related to migration. We need practical solutions that yield tangible results.

15. In 2012, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on International Migration and Development launched an initiative to address the plight of migrants affected by civil conflicts or natural and man-made disasters. The conflict in Libya — when hundreds of thousands of vulnerable migrants found themselves stranded in a conflict-ridden country — prompted his efforts. This is a problem for which real, practical solutions can be found. His initiative serves as a model for how we can move forward in addressing other challenges.

16. I urge Member States to come to the High-level Dialogue prepared to engage in a vigorous debate on the problems and opportunities related to migration. There is no need to agree on every aspect of migration in order to settle on priorities for collaborative action. Creative and effective solutions to common challenges can eventually become global standards.

17. We are on the threshold of a new era of international cooperation on migration. The High-level Dialogue is our chance to cross over it. The eight-point agenda at the end of the present report proposes concrete steps towards a better future both for migrants and for communities.

II. Migration trends

18. Migration continues to increase in scope, complexity and impact. Demographic transition, economic growth and the recent financial crisis are reshaping the face of migration. At the heart of this phenomenon are human beings

in search of decent work and a better or safer life. Across the globe, millions are able to move, live and work in safety and dignity. Yet others are compelled to move owing to poverty, violence and conflict, or environmental changes, and many face exploitation, abuse and other human rights violations along the way.

19. Changes in global production coupled with the globalization of labour markets continue to drive the international movement of labour. In some countries, population ageing adds to labour demands that cannot be met locally. For growing numbers of young people, migration represents the only viable strategy to find gainful employment.

20. Innovations in transportation and technology allow people to migrate with greater frequency over greater distances. With mobility becoming an affordable option for most of the world's citizens, circular migration, return migration and short-term mobility by individuals increasingly complement long-term settlement by families. The result is a more fluid, diverse and nuanced reality, where traditional categorizations and simple dichotomies are increasingly outdated.

A. The global migrant population today

21. Today, the world hosts an estimated 232 million international migrants,¹ of whom 59 per cent are living in the developed regions.² Of this number, 48 per cent are women. Between 2000 and 2013, the estimated number of international migrants in the global North increased by 32 million, while the migrant population in the global South grew by around 25 million.³


22. In 2013, international migrants account for nearly 11 per cent of the total population of developed regions — up from less than 9 per cent in 2000 — compared to less than 2 per cent in the developing regions (see map 1). From 2000 to 2013, the migrant population residing and originating in the global South (South-South migration) increased by almost 23 million persons, while the migrant population residing in the global North but originating in the global South (South-North migration) increased by more than 24 million persons.

¹ "International migrants" are persons living outside their country of birth or citizenship.

² Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Trends in international migrant stock: the 2013 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Rev.2013) (forthcoming).

³ The distinction between developed and developing regions is used for statistical convenience and does not reflect a judgement regarding the developmental stage of a particular country or area. The terms "global North" and "global South" are used synonymously with "developed" and "developing" regions.

Map 1
Share of international migrants in total population




Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Trends in international migrant stock: the 2013 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Rev.2013) (forthcoming).

23. From 2000 to 2013, Asia gained some 20 million international migrants, a 41 per cent increase, adding more migrants during that period than any other major area. As a result, Asia is on track to overtake Europe as the major area hosting the largest number of international migrants in the near future.

24. Over two thirds of the growth in migrant stock that took place in Asia during the period 2000-2013 occurred in Western Asia, growing from 19 to more than 33 million due to the demand for contract workers in the oil producing countries. South-Eastern Asia, which includes rapidly growing economies such as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, also witnessed a sharp increase in the number of international migrants from 2000 to 2013 (see map 2).

25. From 2000 to 2009, the global migrant stock increased by around 4.6 million per year, more than double the annual increase during the preceding decade (2 million). During the first decade of the twenty-first century, Asia recorded the largest increase in the number of international migrants (1.7 million per year), followed by Europe (1.3 million per year) and Northern America (1.1 million per year). Asia also experienced the largest increase as a region of origin: the global migrant stock originating from Asia increased by 2.4 million per year, followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (1.0 million), Africa (0.6 million) and Europe (0.5 million).

Map 2
Change in the international migrant stock, 2000-2013



Source: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, Trends in international migrant stock: the 2013 revision (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Rev.2013) (forthcoming).

26. From 2010 to 2013, the increase in the number of international migrants slowed to around 3.6 million per year. During that period, Europe gained the largest number (1.1 million per year), followed by Asia (1.0 million) and Northern America (0.6 million). In Africa, the migrant stock recorded an annual increase of 0.5 million despite a sharp drop in the number of refugees.

27. Globally, the proportion of female migrants has remained relatively stable, moving from 49.1 per cent in 2000 to 48.0 per cent in 2013. From 2000 to 2013, in Australia and New Zealand, Northern America, South America and Western Europe, the percentage of female migrants increased, owing in part to the longer life expectancy of women. In contrast, the share of female migrants in Africa dropped from 47.2 to 45.9 per cent, while in Asia the proportion of female migrants fell from 45.4 to 41.6 per cent during the same period, owing to the increasing demand for manual labour.

28. The number of international migrants under age 20 increased from 30.9 million in 2000 to 34.9 million in 2013. All of that increase took place in the developing countries. As a result, the global share of young migrants hosted in the developing world rose from 56 per cent in 2000 to 62 per cent in 2013. From 2000 to 2013, Asia added the largest number of young migrants — nearly 3.1 million. In contrast, Northern America saw the number of international migrants under age 20 decline by 0.6 million during the same period. In 2013, the proportion of migrants under age 20 among all migrants was highest in Africa (30 per cent) followed by Latin America and the Caribbean (24 per cent).

29. According to the *Global Education Digest* produced yearly by the Institute of Statistics of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO), some 3.6 million tertiary students were studying outside their country of birth in 2010, a 29 per cent increase compared to 2007. While Northern America and Europe continued to host the majority of international students in 2010, patterns of international student mobility have become more diversified, with growing shares of foreign students studying in Asia and Oceania. The rise in students studying abroad reflects the globalization of tertiary education and the mobility of the highly educated.

30. Since 2000, the number of refugees worldwide has remained relatively stable at around 15.7 million. The share of refugees hosted by developing countries, however, rose from 80 per cent 10 years ago to more than 87 per cent in 2012. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic gave rise to an estimated 1.5 million registered refugees as at July 2013.⁴ The continued presence of large, protracted refugee situations is a stark reminder that crossing international borders is not optional but rather the only viable alternative for millions of people.

31. Environmental factors can be important drivers of migration, although currently they are normally not the sole reason for people to move. Those who cross international borders for such reasons do not enjoy the international protection afforded to refugees. Policies that address migration in the context of environmental change can help people escape situations of vulnerability and build more resilient communities. As such, migration can serve as an important adaptation strategy for communities vulnerable to the effects of climate change and environmental degradation.⁵

32. By its very nature, figures on irregular migration are difficult to obtain. In the United States of America, one of the few countries providing regularly updated information, the number of international migrants without a regular legal status is estimated at more than 11 million.⁶ Other countries with 500,000 or more migrants in an irregular situation include Italy, Malaysia, Thailand and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

B. Recent migration flows to selected countries⁷

33. In 2011, the number of long-term migrants arriving in countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reached 3.8 million persons, similar to the levels of 2009 and 2010, but 13 per cent below the peak of 4.4 million in 2007. While the number of foreigners arriving in Southern Europe has dropped drastically since 2007, immigration levels in most OECD countries have seen little fluctuation, suggesting that while the economic and financial crisis has affected flows to some countries, underlying drivers such as

⁴ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Inter-agency regional response for Syrian refugees — Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey — 27 June-3 July 2013". Available from reliefweb.int.

⁵ United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Government Office for Science, *Foresight: Migration and Global Environmental Change* (London, 2011).

⁶ J. Passel and D. Cohn, "Unauthorized immigrants: 11.1 million in 2011" (Washington, D.C., Pew Research Hispanic Center, 2012).

⁷ Geographic coverage of this analysis is limited owing to the paucity of data on migration flows.

migration policy, migrant networks and demographic change continue to shape migration.⁸

34. The economic and financial crisis had a strong impact on the outflow of citizens from the most affected countries. From 2007 to 2011, the outflow of citizens from Greece and Spain to European and other OECD destination countries more than doubled, while the number of citizens leaving Ireland increased by 80 per cent.

35. Family reunification remains the dominant administrative category for immigrants entering OECD countries.⁹ In 2011, more than 1.3 million immigrants arrived as family members, about a third of the total inflow. The second largest group of immigrants to OECD countries, almost 1 million persons or 25 per cent of the total in 2011, were those who moved under free movement regimes — principally, between countries of the European Union — and who could thus not be classified by the primary purpose of migration. About one sixth of all immigrants to OECD countries — some 680,000 persons — entered for employment purposes. Those workers were accompanied by almost 290,000 family members in 2011. In the past five years, around 300,000 persons were admitted annually to OECD countries as refugees or for other humanitarian reasons, or around 7 per cent of total arrivals.

36. The largest migration flows between developing countries are found in Asia, most notably between South and South-Eastern Asia and countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In 2010 alone, Asian countries issued about 2.2 million labour permits, up from 1.5 million in 2005. The vast majority of those workers were destined for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. At the same time, countries in South-Eastern Asia, such as Malaysia and Thailand, have gained importance as destinations for labour migrants.

37. The main countries of origin of Asian labour migrants are the Philippines, India and Indonesia. While in the Philippines the annual number of labour permits issued increased from about 600,000 in 2000 to more than 900,000 in 2010, India and Indonesia became major sending countries only after 2004, peaking in 2008 with more than 800,000 citizens from each country leaving annually. Labour migrants from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are predominantly male and mostly headed towards the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, whereas migrant workers from Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka are mostly female and work in a more diverse range of countries.

C. Migration and future population change

38. In developed regions, net migration plays an increasingly significant role in maintaining population growth. From 1990 to 2000, net migration surpassed natural increase as the main driver of population growth, a trend that continues today. From 2020 to 2030 onwards, the balance of births minus deaths in developed regions is projected to be negative. Net migration, though not sufficient to counter population decline, will nonetheless contribute to slowing the rate of decrease.

⁸ OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2013*.

⁹ Many immigrants who initially enter under family reunification programmes join the labour market.

39. From 2000 to 2010, developing regions added some 775 million persons through natural increase, while losing 35 million persons owing to net emigration. Although developing regions will continue to experience net emigration, its impact on population size will be small for the foreseeable future.

40. In developed regions, the number of people aged 15-64 peaked in 2010 and could decline by 43 million by 2030. At the same time, the working-age population of developing regions is projected to increase by almost 1 billion from 2010 to 2030. Those demographic contrasts will remain an important driver for migration in the decades to come.

41. Net migration is projected to contribute to delaying the effects of population ageing in developed regions. Yet the dependency ratio (the dependent-age population, under age 20 or over age 65, divided by the working-age population, ages 20 to 64) is projected to increase in developed regions over the next decades despite the inflow of migrants.

III. Impact of migration on development

42. Migration affects migrants and non-migrants alike, in countries of origin, transit and destination. Some effects are felt directly at the household level, others by communities or national economies. Notwithstanding high levels of unemployment in some countries, both developing and developed countries need foreign workers with different skill sets to address critical shortages in their labour markets.

43. The contributions of migrant and diaspora communities are increasingly recognized in countries of destination and origin in the form of remittances, innovation, trade and investment, and through the transfer of technology, skills and knowledge. Developments in information and communication technology have enabled migrants to strengthen ties to their homelands.

A. Impacts on countries of destination

44. A recent OECD study found that international migrants contributed more in taxes and social contributions than they received in individual benefits. Because of their lower wages, the foreign-born contributed less in taxes than the native-born; however, they also received less in benefits.⁸

45. Immigration tends to have little effect on the wages and employment of the general population in a destination country. Nevertheless, it can reduce wages and employment opportunities for low-skilled native-born workers or earlier immigrants if new immigrants become substitutes for similarly low-skilled workers.

46. Evidence suggests that international migration narrowed wage inequality in Canada owing to the country's large proportion of highly skilled immigrants.¹⁰

¹⁰ A. Aydemir and G. Borjas, "Comparative analysis of the labor market impact of international migration: Canada, Mexico and the United States", National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 12327 (Washington, D.C., 2006).

From 1990 to 2006, immigration to the United States had at most a modest negative long-run effect on the real wages of the least educated native-born workers.¹¹

47. Migrants from Nicaragua had a positive impact on average earnings in Costa Rica; earnings in sectors with the highest concentration of migrants, namely domestic service, construction and agriculture, increased faster than earnings in other industries.¹² Conversely, migrant workers in Malaysia had a small but measurable negative impact on real manufacturing wages.¹³

48. A common misperception is that every job taken by an immigrant is one fewer for a native-born worker. A recent study including 14 OECD destination countries and 74 origin countries for the period from 1980 to 2005 demonstrated that immigration increases employment one for one, implying no crowding-out of native-born workers.¹⁴ Immigration tends to increase total economic output: by increasing domestic demand for goods and services, migrants create jobs. In the United States, for example, it was found that immigrants contributed 32 per cent of GDP growth in the period from 2000 to 2007.¹⁵

49. Migrants also contribute as entrepreneurs, starting businesses and employing others. In OECD countries, entrepreneurship was found to be slightly higher among immigrants than among native-born, albeit with marked variations by country of origin and destination, and over time. From 1998 to 2008, foreign-born self-employed owners of small or medium-sized firms created, on average, between 1.4 and 2.1 additional jobs.¹⁶

50. Immigrants represent an important and growing force for innovation and entrepreneurship, especially in the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics. Since 1975, patents obtained in the United States by persons of Chinese and Indian descent increased from less than 2 per cent to 9 per cent and 6 per cent, respectively, while patents registered by inventors of European descent fell from 90 per cent to 76 per cent.¹⁷

B. Impacts on countries of origin

Labour markets

51. Over the past 10 years, the number of highly skilled migrants — such as graduate students, professionals, doctors, information technology experts, entrepreneurs or investors — has grown steadily, as education and skills levels have

¹¹ G.I.P. Ottaviano and G. Peri, "Rethinking the effects of immigration on wages", National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 12497 (Washington, D.C., 2012).

¹² T. H. Gindling, "South-South migration: the impact of Nicaraguan immigrants on earnings, inequality and poverty in Costa Rica", *World Development*, vol. 37, No. 1 (January 2004).

¹³ P. Athukorala and E.S. Devadasan, "The impact of foreign labor on host country wages: the experience of a Southern host, Malaysia", *World Development*, vol. 40, No. 8 (August 2012).

¹⁴ F. Ortega and G. Peri, "The causes and effects of international labor mobility: evidence from OECD countries 1980-2005", United Nations Development Programme Human Development Research Paper 2009/06 (April 2009).

¹⁵ R. Puentes et al., "Towards an assessment of migration, development and human rights links: conceptual framework and new strategic indicators", Peoples' Global Action on Migration, Development, and Human Rights, IV Global Forum (Mexico City, November 2010).

¹⁶ OECD, *International Migration Outlook 2011*.

¹⁷ W. Kerr, "U.S. high-skilled immigration, innovation, and entrepreneurship: empirical approaches and evidence", World Intellectual Property Organization conference paper (2013).

increased and the global competition for human capital has intensified. Recent evidence also shows substantial migration of talented and educated people between developing countries.

52. The negative effects of emigration of the highly skilled, the so-called "brain drain" has been well documented, with the loss of human capital affecting the provision of basic services, draining fiscal resources and reducing economic growth in some contexts. Small developing countries with relatively few professionals are particularly affected by the emigration of highly skilled workers. Emigration of teachers and health-care workers has weakened service delivery in some countries.

53. Emigration may also induce upward pressure on wages and reduce unemployment or underemployment in origin countries, especially in times of high joblessness and economic stagnation. For example, emigration of Mexicans to the United States from 1970 to 2000 may have caused an 8 per cent increase in nominal wages in Mexico.¹⁸

Diaspora, knowledge transfer and social remittances

54. Diaspora communities can play a role in creating markets for products manufactured in their countries of origin. For instance, entrepreneurs born in the Republic of Korea helped introduce cars and electronics built in the Republic of Korea into the United States. Similarly, a Canadian-based study found that a doubling of skilled migration from Asia coincided with a 74 per cent increase in Asian imports to Canada.¹⁹

55. Diaspora networks have long been conduits for the transmission of knowledge, information and know-how from destination to origin. Researchers, scientists and technology experts living abroad may lead to a "brain gain" in their home countries if the prospect of migration encourages individuals to improve their education and skills in anticipation of a potential move.²⁰

56. Migrants who have become successful entrepreneurs in their destination countries play an important role in flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Diaspora communities can be both a direct source of FDI and effective intermediaries to channel FDI towards home countries.

57. Several countries have developed policies and programmes to encourage diaspora populations to make greater financial investments in their homelands. Strategies include providing access to information regarding investment opportunities, facilitating connections with homeland business networks and investing in public infrastructure in support of FDI projects. In India, for instance, initiatives have included providing taxation privileges to expatriates using Indian

¹⁸ P. Mishra, "Emigration and wages in source countries: evidence from Mexico", *Journal of Development Economics*, vol. 82, No. 1 (January 2007).

¹⁹ K. Head and J. Ries, "Immigration and trade creation: econometric evidence from Canada", *Canadian Journal of Economics*, vol. 31, No. 1 (1998); R. E. B. Lucas, "Diaspora and development: highly skilled migrants from East Asia", prepared for the World Bank (2001).

²⁰ See, for example: B. Xiang, "Towards sustainable 'brain circulation': what India and China can learn from each other", International Conference on Population and Development in Asia (2006); and C. Wescott, "Promoting exchanges through diasporas", Group of 20 workshop on Demographic Challenges and Migration (2005).

banks for their savings, organizing an annual conference of expatriates and the establishment of a separate ministry to formalize its interaction with the diaspora.

58. In China, a long-standing policy encourages the return of highly skilled emigrants and promotes ties between expatriates and the homeland.²¹ In some developing countries, migrants who return from abroad are more likely to become entrepreneurs compared to non-migrants owing in part to human capital and savings acquired overseas.

59. Countries of origin also benefit from the ideas, attitudes and behaviours of returning migrants. Social remittances can have an impact in creating a more conducive environment for development initiatives at home. For example, the Indian diaspora has had an effect in improving efficiencies in the homeland bureaucracy and facilitating economic reforms.²¹

Remittances

60. Transnational communities can have positive developmental impacts on their homelands, especially through financial transfers. In 2012, recorded remittances to developing countries reached an all-time high of \$401 billion.²² India, China, the Philippines and Mexico, in descending order, are the largest recipients of migrant remittances; smaller countries, such as Tajikistan, Liberia, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho and the Republic of Moldova, also in descending order, receive the most as a share of gross domestic product.

61. Remittances to developing countries declined by 4.8 per cent in 2009 during the financial crisis, after growing by 16.5 and 22.9 per cent in the two previous years. They recovered quickly, however, and are expected to grow by an annual average of 8.8 per cent for the next three years, reaching \$515 billion in 2015.²²

62. While the global costs of transferring remittances decreased from 2008 to 2010, that trend has halted and reversed since then, with the global average remaining at about 9 per cent.²³ This finding suggests that the commitment to reduce the transfer costs of remittances from 10 per cent to 5 per cent over five years — the “5 by 5” objective, adopted first by the Group of Eight in 2009 and reaffirmed by the Group of 20 in 2011 — requires renewed emphasis. Factors contributing to high remittance costs in some corridors include insufficient competition, lack of transparency and regulatory obstacles.

63. Remittances augment the income of households and are often spent on basic subsistence needs, such as food, housing and clothing, and on durable goods. Remittances are also used to pay for health and education, directly improving human capital. Remittances that are spent or invested in countries of origin help generate income and employment. Remittances per se, however, are not sufficient to ensure investment and savings by remittance-receiving households: the financial environment in countries of origin must be hospitable to investment, and migrants must be able to trust the government and institutions.

²¹ D. Kapur, “Ideas and economic reforms in India: the role of international migration and the Indian diaspora”, *India Review*, vol. 3, No. 4 (October 2004).

²² World Bank, Migration and Remittances Unit, Development Prospects Group, “Migration and development brief 20”. Available from worldbank.org.

²³ World Bank, “Remittance prices worldwide”, No. 5 (March 2013). Available from remittanceprices.worldbank.org.

64. Remittances are private financial flows and should not be conflated with official development assistance. Given the selectivity of migration and uneven distribution of remittances, only certain communities, families or individuals may benefit.

C. Impacts on children and families

65. Children are affected by migration in various ways: as migrants themselves, by staying behind in countries of origin or by being born to migrant parents in countries of destination. An increasing number of children and adolescents are migrating in search of improved standards of living, family reunification, education and safety.

66. Although migration can be an empowering experience, young people are particularly vulnerable to violence, exploitation and abuse during all stages of migration. Unaccompanied and separated children are at particular risk. Children in the context of irregular migration face numerous challenges, including detention, deportation (of themselves or their parents) and lack of access to basic rights and services, such as birth registration, education, health care and housing.

67. In countries of origin, migration can be an enabler of the empowerment of girls and of gender equality — for example, by increasing girls' enrolment in school — primarily as a result of remittances sent home. Migration can also reinforce existing gender inequalities, however, if, in the absence of one or both parents, girls and boys are forced to assume responsibilities as primary caregiver or breadwinner, which may lead to children dropping out of school. Adolescents are particularly susceptible to emotional and psychosocial problems associated with parental separation.

68. In situations in which migrants lose contact with their families, the strains of family separation are not compensated by the financial gains of remittances or other benefits accruing from migration.²⁴ Migration also affects older persons who remain behind. By taking over childcare and household responsibilities, the elderly make it possible for younger family members to seek employment abroad.

IV. Towards a global policy agenda

69. There is a growing consensus that migration is an integral feature of global development in the twenty-first century. Efforts should focus on facilitating international mobility, protecting and fulfilling the human rights of migrants and their families and creating regular, safe and orderly migration channels that reflect the realities of the labour market. While people have the right to leave and re-enter their own country, States have the sovereign right to regulate the entry and stay of foreigners on their territories.

²⁴ United Nations Children's Fund, "Impact of migration on 'children left behind' in Tajikistan". Available from unicef.org/tajikistan/resources_18660.html.

A. Highlighting contributions of migration while affirming and protecting migrant rights

Assessment

70. All persons, without discrimination, must be able to exercise their fundamental human and labour rights. In practice, however, many migrants face barriers in exercising their human rights and accessing social protection and basic services.

71. Efforts to respect, protect and fulfil the human rights of migrants are hindered by gaps in the regulation and facilitation of migration. Few States have adequate policy and legislative frameworks or trained personnel to facilitate regular migration and reduce the incidence of irregular migration. In situations in which regular migration channels fail to reflect labour market needs, migrants are more likely to engage in irregular movement. Migrants in an irregular situation face a greater risk of exploitation and abuse; they also tend to lack access to basic services and are at risk of detention.

72. Advances in understanding the multiple contributions of migration to development have not kept pace with public perceptions. Indeed, the notion that migration is an aberration from the norm, rather than an essential feature of development, is still widespread. In the aftermath of the global economic and financial crisis, anti-immigrant sentiments have in some cases fuelled discrimination and violence against migrants. There is a need for greater public awareness about the human rights of migrants and the contributions of migrants through their labour, skills, knowledge, ideas and values.

Recommendations

73. Member States should reaffirm the protection of the human rights of all migrants, taking into account age, gender and family considerations as well as specific vulnerabilities. To that end, States should ratify and implement the core international human rights and labour rights instruments, particularly those dedicated to protecting migrant workers, such as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families of 1990 and the Convention concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 1949) (Convention No. 97), the Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (Convention No. 143) and the Domestic Workers Convention (Convention No. 189) of the International Labour Organization (ILO). Law enforcement and criminal justice responses to xenophobic acts and discrimination against migrants should be strengthened. All migrants should be free from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment and have effective access to complaint mechanisms and judicial remedies.

74. Member States should seek to improve public understanding of migrant contributions to home and host societies and address misperceptions of migration. Such efforts could be reinforced through national action plans developed in collaboration with the private sector, the media and organizations representing migrants, employers and workers.

75. Some migrant groups face specific vulnerabilities and discrimination. Member States should guarantee access by children to all rights under the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The best interests of the child should always take priority.

Detention of migrant children constitutes a violation of child rights. Female migrants should be protected against gender-based discrimination and violence at all stages of the migration process and in the workplace. Special attention should be given to migrant needs in the area of sexual and reproductive health.

76. Migrant workers, irrespective of their status, should be protected from abuse and exploitation in formal and informal labour markets. Vital steps include enforcing child labour laws, enabling migrant workers to change their employers after arrival in the destination country, ensuring equal treatment in terms of wages and working conditions, employing a system to recognize diplomas and competencies and regulating and monitoring recruitment agencies. The portability of social security benefits for migrants should be improved through bilateral or multilateral agreements.

77. States need to address the protection challenges that affect migrants having an irregular legal status, including access to health care, education, adequate housing and essential documents, such as birth registration for their children. Regularization should be considered for undocumented migrants who are well integrated or unable to return to their countries of origin, or when family members have different legal statuses. Opportunities for regular migration should be broadened, in particular for low-skilled migrant workers. States should seek alternatives to administrative detention of irregular migrants, especially children. In addition, States and other partners should disseminate information on the use of regular migration channels.

78. Comprehensive efforts against human trafficking and migrant smuggling should be continued, and programmes to assist smuggled migrants and trafficked persons should be reinforced. Persons forcibly displaced as a result of insecurity and conflict, or at risk of torture or persecution upon return, should receive protection from refoulement. Access by refugees to temporary labour migration schemes should be explored.

B. Strengthening the evidence base²⁵


Assessment

79. In most developing countries, the population census is the primary official source for migration data, providing limited information on migrant stocks once every 10 years; however, censuses do not provide information on circular and temporary migration.

80. Since 1995, most countries (80 per cent) have reported the total number of female and male migrants residing within their borders for at least one point in time. Fewer countries (75 per cent) provide information on international migrants by country of birth or citizenship, and fewer still (around two thirds) report the age of migrants. Origin information is available for 66 per cent of countries in Asia and 59 per cent in Africa. Only 4 in 10 African countries provide information on the age of migrants (see figure 1).

²⁵ See resolution 2013/1 in *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, 2013, Supplement No. 5 (E/2013/25)*.

Figure 1
Percentage of countries for which core characteristics of immigrants
are available



Source: United Nations (2013), *Trends in International Migrant Stock: the 2013 Revision* (forthcoming).

81. Effective policymaking requires detailed data on international migrant stocks and flows, legal status, education and skills, duration of stay and economic, social and legal integration. Information is also needed on occupational distributions, working conditions, wages, access to services and safety and health conditions. Particular challenges persist in collecting data on migrants having an irregular legal status. Human rights indicators relevant to migration are also urgently needed.

82. Better data would facilitate the assessment of labour market needs, social protection schemes, contributions of diaspora communities and the effects of migration and development initiatives. More can be done to strengthen the existing systems for data collection and analysis and to introduce new measures where required.

Recommendations

83. The High-level Dialogue to be held in 2013 should encourage sustained capacity development to generate and maintain timely and comparable migration data and improve relevant information systems. Such data should be collected in accordance with international standards of privacy and protection.

84. Population censuses should include key migration questions, such as country of birth, country of citizenship and year or period of arrival.²⁶ Cross-tabulations

²⁶ See also Center for Global Development, *Migrants Count: Five Steps toward Better Migration Data* (Washington D.C., 2009).

from the census should include variables such as age, sex and levels of education and skills.

85. Migration issues should be included, where feasible, in national labour force surveys, living standards measurement studies, multiple indicator cluster surveys and demographic and health surveys. If migration modules cannot be integrated into existing survey programmes, dedicated migration surveys may be needed.

86. Existing administrative data should be better exploited and standards for their compilation should be developed. Administrative sources useful for the study of migration include visa applications and decisions, labour permit data, asylum adjudication decisions and entry and exit systems. Those sources are particularly relevant in ascertaining the reasons for migration.

87. International cooperation, in particular the exchange of statistical information between countries of origin and destination, is essential for improving migration data. Diaspora profiles, for example, may be generated through the use of census and administrative data from major countries of destination.

C. Integrating migration into national development strategies and the post-2015 development agenda

Assessment

88. Few national development plans incorporate migration. Those that mention it tend to focus on immigration control, irregular migration and human trafficking, rather than also recognizing the benefits of migration for development. As a result, migration and development initiatives remain scattered, underfunded, lacking in national ownership and limited in scale and impact. The development potential of particular migrants groups, such as low- and semi-skilled workers, diasporas, returning migrants and refugees, is rarely recognized.

Recommendations

89. The High-level Dialogue offers an opportunity to present a convincing case about the development impacts of migration. Building on the momentum of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, migration should be integrated within the sustainable development goals and the post-2015 development agenda.

90. The inclusion of migration in national and subnational development strategies and plans, such as poverty reduction strategies and national adaptation programmes of action, should be promoted. Coherent labour migration and employment policies should allow for a more effective matching of labour supply and demand of both high- and low-skilled workers. That could include broadening opportunities for the temporary or permanent migration of low-skilled workers.

91. States should ensure mutual recognition of foreign qualifications, based on six UNESCO conventions and associated work on the recognition of qualifications. Origin and destination countries could create joint education programmes and curricula that reflect domestic and foreign labour market needs and provide information on overseas employment opportunities.

92. The regulatory framework for financial services should be improved in order to reduce remittance transfer costs, including in rural areas. Barriers to market entry, including exclusivity agreements and skewed incentive structures, should be tackled. Public-private partnerships could enhance the interoperability of remittance transfer services by banks, postal networks, telecommunications operators and microfinance institutions. New financial products, such as microinsurance, could be developed to meet the specific needs of migrants.

93. There is a need for greater cooperation between countries of origin and destination in leveraging diaspora contributions, including investment and trade. Tangible and sustained cooperation among relevant ministries, embassies, diaspora associations, development non-governmental organizations and the private sector can support diaspora groups. Diaspora communities can also play a constructive role in countries of origin through the temporary return of qualified nationals to assist in post-conflict situations and through out-of-country voting.

D. Strengthening dialogue, cooperation and coherence at all levels

Assessment

94. The General Assembly considers the issue of international migration and development and the protection of the human rights of migrants on a regular basis as part of its review of the implementation of the internationally agreed development goals. The Economic and Social Council considers such topics in its follow-up to the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development.

95. The Global Forum on Migration and Development has promoted dialogue and cooperation on international migration in practical and action-oriented ways. It has debated sensitive issues, such as migrant rights and irregular migration, and initiated a constructive exchange of ideas with civil society. Despite the Forum's success overall, challenges remain in implementing its recommendations, ensuring its long-term sustainability and defining its relation with the United Nations.

96. The Global Migration Group has achieved greater inter-agency coordination and cooperation in the field of migration, advocated for the rights of migrants and made multiple contributions to the Global Forum on Migration and Development.

97. In 2013, the High-level Committee on Programmes of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination prepared a set of recommendations and outcomes for the High-level Dialogue. This initiative, co-led by the United Nations Population Fund and IOM, provided an inventory of lessons learned since 2006, remaining challenges and a joint vision for future action, and served as an important input to the present report.

98. Regional cooperation on migration has grown significantly in recent years. Regional economic communities have witnessed a renewed interest in implementing provisions for the free movement of labour and started to focus on the development impacts of migration. The European Union, for instance, has as one of its founding principles the free movement of its citizens and has developed standards for portability of health care and pensions. The Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) have also introduced measures to promote the free movement of their citizens.

99. Since the late 1980s, an array of informal regional consultative processes on migration has complemented regional economic integration mechanisms. While the priorities of regional consultative processes differ, ranging from controlling borders and combating migrant smuggling to facilitating labour mobility, most address migration and development issues. By building trust, enhancing understanding and exchanging information and good practices, the processes have contributed to migration policy development, practice and cooperation, and have promoted the convergence of policy perspectives in some regions.

100. Cooperation has also increased considerably at the bilateral level, mainly through labour agreements between countries of origin and destination. While such agreements provide a basis to regulate bilateral flows, reduce irregular movements and avoid excessive migration costs, provisions do not always meet international obligations, implementation remains uneven and monitoring responsibilities are sometimes unclear.

Recommendations

101. The High-level Dialogue should underline the crucial role of dialogue and cooperation on migration at the global, regional, bilateral, national and local levels, and promote the coherence of sectoral policies at the national level. Member States should use existing forums, including regional integration mechanisms and informal consultative processes, to promote multilateral cooperation. Regional and bilateral agreements should seek to protect the human rights of migrants, improve access to social protection, facilitate the recognition of diplomas and qualifications, support labour mobility and promote its development impact. Cooperation between bilateral, regional and global forums, the Global Forum on Migration and Development and the Global Migration Group should be enhanced.

102. The Global Forum on Migration and Development could engage the Global Migration Group more systematically in supporting its preparations and in implementing its recommendations. United Nations Resident Coordinators and United Nations country teams should be actively involved in mainstreaming migration into national development efforts through country-level programming, drawing on the expertise and capacities of Global Migration Group members and the broader United Nations system. The Global Migration Group also serves an important function in providing analysis and information on the international normative framework on migration, a role that could be further strengthened.

103. Civil society is a key partner to ensure implementation at the field level. States could develop a compact with the private sector and other civil society actors around selected common goals, such as reducing recruitment costs and addressing the social impacts of migration for vulnerable groups. Multi-stakeholder action is also a priority in addressing the situation of migrants affected by crises, with employers, recruiters, governments and relevant international organizations all having a role.

104. The voices of migrants should be brought to bear on major policy decisions. One option would be to create a permanent forum on migration and development, modelled on the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. Such a forum would bring to the table advice and perspectives from leaders within the migrant community and raise public awareness and visibility of the issues.

E. Emerging issues

Assessment

105. The crisis in Libya in 2011 brought to light the plight of migrants stranded in dire humanitarian situations. Too often, migrants have been overlooked in humanitarian responses, as migration policies, including temporary labour migration schemes, do not make adequate provision for crisis events affecting migrant workers.

106. Environmental factors have long been known to affect migration, and vice versa, but the realities of climate change could give new meaning to that relationship. Migration could become an important mode of adaptation to the consequences of climate change.

107. Although most migration takes place regionally, including among developing countries, South-South migration has received comparatively little attention. At the same time, developing and least developed countries are often the least equipped to address migration concerns and leverage its benefits.

Recommendations

108. The High-level Dialogue should foster action on problems faced by stranded migrants, especially those caught in crises in host countries. States and humanitarian actors must ensure protection and assistance in such cases, including voluntary evacuation and reintegration as necessary. For migrants in distress at sea, improved cooperation agreements, particularly at the regional level, should be put in place to secure timely rescue, safe disembarkation and respect for human rights principles, in particular the principles of non-refoulement and of the best interests of the child.

109. As the impact on migration of climate change and environmental degradation — including both slow- and rapid-onset events — is becoming more evident, the High-level Dialogue could encourage Member States to integrate migration and migrants more systematically into disaster risk-reduction and national adaptation programmes of action, using the latest weather, climate and water information technology.

110. The High-level Dialogue should consider the impact of the rise in South-South migration for, inter alia, labour mobility and the engagement of diaspora communities.

V. Making migration work: an eight-point agenda for action

1. Protect the human rights of all migrants

111. Member States should be encouraged to ratify and implement all relevant international instruments related to international migration, including the core international human rights instruments, relevant ILO conventions, the protocols against human trafficking and migrant smuggling and the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. Alternatives to the administrative detention of migrants should be explored, while the detention of migrant children should be avoided. Countries should eliminate all discrimination against migrants with regard to working

conditions and wages and with regard to fundamental economic, social and cultural rights. Migrant children should have equal access to education, and all migrants should have access to essential health services.

112. Member States should commit to protecting and promoting the human rights of migrants at all stages of the migration process, including migrants having an irregular legal status. Access to legal migration channels should be enhanced, reflecting actual and projected labour market needs while taking into account human capital requirements in countries of origin and facilitating family unity.

2. Reduce the costs of labour migration

113. There are enormous gains to be made by lowering costs related to migration, such as the transfer costs of remittances and fees paid to recruiters, especially by low-skilled migrant workers. In addition, countries can strengthen the benefits of migration by enhancing the portability of social security and other acquired rights, and by promoting the mutual recognition of diplomas, qualifications and skills.

3. Eliminate migrant exploitation, including human trafficking

114. Member States should commit to the elimination of all forms of exploitation affecting migrants, especially trafficking in persons and other forms of modern-day slavery. Areas of action include discouraging the demand that fosters human trafficking, ensuring the protection of victims, prosecuting offenders and ensuring that companies eliminate forced labour from their global supply chains.

4. Address the plight of stranded migrants

115. The plight of migrants unable to return to their country of origin as a result of humanitarian crises in their country of destination or transit has often been overlooked. Member States should strengthen their capacities to assist migrants and their families in crisis situations through better preparedness, expanded consular assistance and assisted voluntary evacuation, return and reintegration. Initiatives to create a framework for action to assist stranded migrants, bringing together Member States, international organizations, civil society and the private sector, should be supported.

5. Improve public perceptions of migrants

116. There is a need to combat discrimination, xenophobia and intolerance against migrants and their families by creating greater public awareness about the situations migrants experience and the contributions they make to countries of origin and destination. Such efforts could be promoted through a partnership of the private sector, labour unions, the media, educational institutions and migrants themselves, based on the latest available evidence and highlighting the rights and responsibilities of both migrants and non-migrants.

6. Integrate migration into the development agenda

117. Migration is a test of relevance for the development debate and of fair and effective governance, demanding coordinated action not only among States but at all levels of government. Member States should mainstream migration into national development plans, poverty reduction strategies and relevant sectoral policies and programmes. The international community should define a common set of targets and indicators to monitor the implementation of measures aimed at enhancing the benefits and addressing the challenges of international migration, for consideration in the framework of the post-2015 development agenda.

118. The preceding six action points can only be achieved by strengthening the evidence base, building national capacities and enhancing cooperation and partnerships.

7. Strengthen the migration evidence base

119. Member States should promote evidence-based policymaking and invest in data collection, research and capacity development with respect to migration and its impacts on individuals, communities and societies. The international community should create a dedicated capacity-building initiative to assist countries in improving the collection and use of migration data. The effort should include population censuses and administrative data sources as well as dedicated surveys for assessing the impacts of migration on social and economic development. The use of measurable targets and indicators for monitoring the protection of migrants and violations of their rights should be promoted.

8. Enhance migration partnerships and cooperation

120. No country can manage international migration alone. Stakeholders have developed many ideas for how governments, the private sector and civil society can build partnerships relating to mobility policies that reduce discrimination against migrants and protect their rights; lower the human, social and economic costs of migration; expand opportunities for migrants to invest their earnings more productively and share their knowledge; and enlist migrants and diaspora organizations in enhancing development in their communities of origin and destination.

121. Cooperation and dialogue on migration involving the United Nations, IOM and regional economic communities should be strengthened. The Global Forum on Migration and Development and regional consultative processes can be a useful complement to those formal intergovernmental mechanisms.



General Assembly

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Sixty-eighth session

Request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the sixty-eighth session

Observer status for the Global Green Growth Institute in the General Assembly

Letter dated 16 August 2013 from the representatives of Cambodia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Guyana, Mongolia, Norway, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Rwanda, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Viet Nam to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Pursuant to rule 14 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, we have the honour to request the inclusion of an item entitled "Observer status for the Global Green Growth Institute in the General Assembly" in the agenda of the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly.

In accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, enclosed herewith are an explanatory memorandum,* the Agreement on the Establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute* and the draft resolution.*

In addition, we would like to request that the present letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly.

(Signed) Eduardo Ulibarri
Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations

(Signed) Ib Petersen
Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

(Signed) Aman Hassen Bame
Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic
of Ethiopia to the United Nations

* On file with the Secretariat and available for consultation.



(Signed) **Robert Guba Aisi**
Permanent Representative of the Independent State of
Papua New Guinea to the United Nations

(Signed) **Mengeang Nay**
Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Cambodia to the United Nations

(Signed) **Od Och**
Permanent Representative of Mongolia to the United Nations

(Signed) **Geir O. Pedersen**
Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations

(Signed) **Troy Torrington**
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Guyana to the United Nations

(Signed) **Kim Sook**
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations

(Signed) **Eugène-Richard Gasana**
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Rwanda to the United Nations

(Signed) **Libran N. Cabactulan**
Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations

(Signed) **Le Hoai Trung**
Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
to the United Nations

(Signed) **Ahmed Al-Jarman**
Permanent Representative of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations

(Signed) **Philip Parham**
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations



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* Reissued for technical reasons on 29 August 2013.



(Signed) **Aman Hassen Bame**
Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations

(Signed) **Troy Torrington**
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of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations

(Signed) **Le Hoai Trung**
Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam
to the United Nations

Annex I

Explanatory memorandum

I. Historical background

1. The Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) was established at the initiative of the Republic of Korea, with a vision of shifting the current development paradigm of quantity-oriented, fossil-fuel-dependent growth to quality-oriented and sustainable economic growth. In the new paradigm, green economy and green growth are dynamic tools to achieve sustainable development, addressing the economic, environmental and social pillars in a balanced way and with a strong focus on implementation. The Institute originated as an amalgamation of ideas from the public and private sectors committed to helping developing countries on the transition towards a low-carbon, inclusive and sustainable economic growth path.
2. The Institute was initially formed as a non-profit foundation under the domestic laws of the Republic of Korea in May 2010 and became an international organization when the Agreement on the Establishment of the Global Green Growth Institute was signed in June 2012 and entered into force in October 2012.
3. Membership in the Institute is, in accordance with article 5 of the Agreement, open to any Member State of the United Nations as well as to regional integration organizations.
4. As of June 2013, the Institute had 20 member States. The Institute is headquartered in Seoul and has branch offices in Copenhagen, Abu Dhabi and London.

II. The instrument establishing the Global Green Growth Institute

5. The Agreement that established the Global Green Growth Institute was signed in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on 20 June 2012 by the Commonwealth of Australia, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Costa Rica, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, the Republic of Kiribati, the Kingdom of Norway, the Independent State of Papua New Guinea, the Republic of Paraguay, the State of Qatar, the Republic of Korea, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
6. The Agreement was also subsequently signed by the Republic of the Philippines, on 21 June 2012, the Republic of Indonesia, on 17 September 2012, the United Mexican States, on 12 October 2012, and Mongolia and the Republic of Rwanda, on 9 June 2013. The Agreement entered into force on 18 October 2012.

III. Members

7. Currently, the following 20 countries are the member States of the Global Green Growth Institute:

Australia
Cambodia
Costa Rica
Denmark
Ethiopia
Guyana
Indonesia
Kiribati
Mexico
Mongolia
Norway
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Philippines
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Rwanda
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Viet Nam

IV. Purpose and function

8. Pursuant to article 2 of the Agreement, "[t]he GGGI shall promote sustainable development of developing and emerging countries, including the least developed countries, by: (a) supporting and diffusing a new paradigm of economic growth: green growth, which is a balanced advance of economic growth and environmental sustainability; (b) targeting key aspects of economic performance and resilience, poverty reduction, job creation and social inclusion, and those of environmental sustainability such as climate change mitigation and adaptation, biodiversity protection and securing access to affordable, clean energy, clean water and land; and (c) creating and improving the economic, environmental and social conditions of developing and emerging countries through partnerships between developed and developing countries and the public and private sectors."

9. The Institute supports developing countries that seek to leapfrog the resource-intensive and environmentally unsustainable model of economic development pioneered in an earlier era by industrialized economies, by providing them with tailored and sustained programmes of technical and capacity-building assistance. In this way, the Institute assists developing countries in pursuing the green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, as an important tool for achieving sustainable development.

10. The Institute's core activity is green growth planning and implementation, through which it provides expert technical assistance and capacity-building to developing countries and emerging economies. Currently, the Institute has green growth planning and implementation programmes in 18 developing countries, as well as 3 multi-country programmes. Through these programmes, the Institute supports developing countries and emerging economies in their development of green and inclusive economic development strategies, and their implementation of these strategies, including through financial analysis and public-private cooperation.

11. The Institute provides the best available analytical tools and helps build institutional capacity to apply them, through a tailored, consistent programme for partner countries based on specific national circumstances and priorities. Programmes are implemented in close cooperation with partner countries, including national, provincial and municipal authorities. The Institute maintains a presence on the ground to facilitate capacity-building and ensure full country ownership.
12. The Institute initiates its cooperation programmes on the basis of a high-level request from a developing country Government. The Institute's approach is particularly suited to developing countries because its point of departure is inclusive and green economic growth, leading to broad-based progress in living standards and quality of life.
13. The scope of work for the Institute in a developing country depends on the country's specific situation and development goals. Initially, and in close collaboration with the Government, the Institute conducts a comprehensive diagnosis of the country's green growth potential and its internal and external challenges. The diagnosis involves assessing physical and socioeconomic conditions as well as the potential for aligning an inclusive green economy approach with the country's development priorities. The next step establishes a green growth pathway, refines the policy options available and identifies the options for implementation, in particular financing and public-private cooperation. This includes actions in priority sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, water, transport and energy, according to the partner country's specific circumstances and priorities.
14. Currently, the Institute cooperates with the following countries and provinces (in alphabetical order):
 - (a) Africa: the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Kingdom of Morocco, the Republic of Rwanda and the Republic of South Africa;
 - (b) Asia: the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Karnataka (Republic of India), the Republic of Kazakhstan, Mongolia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Kingdom of Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and Yunnan Province (in the People's Republic of China);
 - (c) Latin America and the Caribbean: the Federative Republic of Brazil, the United Mexican States and the Republic of Peru.
15. In addition, the Institute has multi-country programmes in the Amazon, Aral Sea and Mekong regions. A programme among small island developing States is under preparation.
16. In the Kingdom of Cambodia, the Institute supported the Government in establishing institutional and legal frameworks and elaborating a national green growth policy and strategy. The strategy identifies a number of specific actions, and currently the Institute is looking into how best to support their implementation.
17. In the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, the Institute supported the Government in developing a climate-resilient green economy plan. This included national strategies on climate resilience and green economy (low-carbon development), underpinned by scientific and economic analysis. Currently, the Institute is supporting the Government in implementing the green economy plan, including setting concrete targets across different sectors and regions and assessing

the policies required, taking into account barriers to implementation, to meet these targets.

18. In the People's Republic of China, the Institute plans to assist Yunnan Province in pursuing green growth by developing a five-year green growth action plan in line with the national and provincial development plans. The Institute also focuses on selected sectoral projects and provides training to key stakeholders in order to build local capacity in green growth planning and implementation.

19. In the United Mexican States, the Institute and the Government have designed a jointly funded programme of collaboration that supports the federal Government in developing a climate-resilience plan aimed at reducing economic vulnerability, especially among the poorest populations. It is also developing proposals for public-private cooperation and creating South-South dialogue and knowledge transfer.

20. The Institute's two other programmes — research and public-private cooperation — are designed to support the delivery of the green growth planning and implementation programmes, in particular the quality of the analytical and implementation support provided to the Governments of developing countries. This includes South-South and North-South knowledge-sharing.

21. The Institute's research programme analyses the development of the green growth paradigm in developing countries by conducting research on green growth theory and practice. The focus is on areas where there is the greatest need for additional research, identified jointly with senior policymakers (e.g., chief economic advisers and finance, economy and planning ministries) and leading economists in developing and emerging countries. The main outcome is relevant, high-quality research that explores the potential of inclusive green growth and provides practical guidance to policymakers, especially in developing and emerging countries.

22. The research programme prioritizes the following topic areas as they apply to developing and emerging countries: green growth planning tools and methodology; lessons from in-country green growth planning experience; economic theory and policy of green growth; resource efficiency and green growth, including sectoral opportunities and approaches; technological innovation and green growth; employment and poverty reduction; social innovation and welfare; the political economy of green growth; and international economic cooperation and green growth.

23. Some of the Institute's research is generated primarily by in-house researchers and draws heavily on the Institute's green growth planning and implementation experience in developing and emerging countries. Other research is conducted in partnership with leading economic policy institutes and research centres in both developing and advanced countries, especially on more theoretical and technology-focused issues.

24. Among the initiatives carried out under the research programme which may provide useful inputs to United Nations processes are the Green Growth Knowledge Platform and the Green Growth Best Practices. In the Green Growth Knowledge Platform, the Institute cooperates with the World Bank, the United Nations Environment Programme and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to create a global network of researchers and development experts with the aim of identifying and addressing major knowledge gaps in green economy and green growth theory and practice. The Platform provides policymakers

with the tools to facilitate the transition, and identifies and addresses major knowledge gaps in green economy theory and practice, in order to help countries design and implement policies to move towards a green economy.

25. The Green Growth Best Practices initiative conducts fact-based analysis of green growth best practices with a team of expert authors from all regions. The assessment results are documented and shared through handbooks, policy briefs, training materials, a website and other audience-tailored resources, as well as through policy dialogue workshops, outreach to countries, webinars and other learning forums. In this initiative, the Institute cooperates with the Climate and Development Knowledge Network and the European Climate Foundation.

26. The Institute's public-private cooperation programme facilitates the engagement of the resources and expertise of the private sector, both domestically and internationally, in the implementation of green growth strategies in the Institute's partner countries.

27. Through this programme, the Institute facilitates public-private cooperation by linking companies to developing country Governments that are seeking private sector finance, technology and expertise to accelerate the implementation of their green growth or green economy plans. The Institute connects the partner countries with potential private sector providers of capital and technology by developing specific investment plans in key sectors that help tap domestic and external, as well as public and private, sources of finance.

28. In addition, the public-private cooperation programme builds intra- and cross-industry programmes of cooperation, and links them to relevant intergovernmental processes, to expand markets in developing and emerging countries for resource-efficient products, services and industrial processes, and to facilitate technology transfer. The programme elevates the importance that political and business leaders attach to the role of public-private cooperation for implementation.

29. As part of the public-private cooperation programme, the Institute acts as a strategic partner of the Global Green Growth Forum, which is a high-level partnership of three developed countries (the Kingdom of Denmark, the Republic of Korea and the State of Qatar) and three developing countries (the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Kenya and the United Mexican States) that seeks to support the innovation and scaling-up of private sector engagement in various aspects of green growth.

30. In June 2013, in recognition of the sustainable benefits that the Institute has brought and will be able to bring to developing and emerging countries, the OECD Development Assistance Committee Working Party on Development Finance Statistics approved the addition of the Institute to the list of international organizations eligible for official development assistance.

V. Governance bodies

31. The Institute's governance structure consists of the Assembly, the Council and the Secretariat, whose functions are as follows:

(a) The Assembly is composed of the members of the Institute and meets every two years. The functions of the Assembly include advising on the overall

direction of the Institute and reviewing the organization's progress in meeting its stated objectives. The Assembly also elects Council members and appoints a Director General;

(b) The Council serves as the executive organ of the Institute and thus approves the organization's strategy, budget, admission of new members and criteria for its programmes;

(c) The Secretariat acts as the chief operational organ of the organization and is headed by the Director General, who represents the Institute externally and provides strategic leadership for the organization in carrying out its objectives.

VI. Observer status in the United Nations General Assembly

32. The Institute is a treaty-based international organization dedicated to contributing to the successful outcome of the United Nations process on sustainable development and the attainment of internationally agreed development goals.

33. The Institute and its members adhere fully to the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations.

34. As a new international organization with a focus on developing countries, the Institute contributes in a concrete way towards the objectives and frameworks established by the United Nations and other international bodies in the areas of sustainable development and poverty reduction, including Agenda 21; the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; the Barbados Programme of Action and the Mauritius Strategy; the Istanbul Programme of Action; the internationally agreed commitments related to Africa's development needs; the Millennium Development Goals; the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation; and the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, entitled "The future we want" (General Assembly resolution 66/288, annex).

35. Consistent with, and in active support of, these United Nations frameworks, the Institute cooperates with developing countries and emerging economies to facilitate and implement the transition towards a green economy in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication, as defined and detailed in the outcome document of the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development.

36. Through its programmes, the Institute helps developing countries and emerging economies to achieve sustainable development through green economy policies, to integrate the green economy potential into their national development strategies and investment plans, and to mobilize national and international resources.

37. Developing countries sometimes lack the expertise to build "bankable" investment cases, leading to difficulties in attracting finance. The Institute helps fill this gap through its familiarity with the country's green growth plan, the strategic relationship it builds with the Government in helping to design their plans, and its neutrality in the sense of not being a financing agency or bilateral cooperation partner.

38. Cooperation with the Institute makes partner countries ready to benefit from international funding sources which support investments in a green economy, including the Green Climate Fund and other climate financing mechanisms.

39. Granting the Institute observer status in the General Assembly would enable the Institute to provide targeted inputs to current and future United Nations processes, based on real-life experiences from its country programmes, its research and public-private cooperation activities and its global knowledge-sharing activities.

40. The Institute can contribute valuable and innovative analytical inputs and knowledge to the United Nations by providing:

(a) Best practice experience and tools for the implementation of green economy policies and legislation;

(b) Macroeconomic and cross-sectoral analysis on the green economy, including impacts on poverty alleviation and productive employment;

(c) Analysis of financial options, investment flows and market-based mechanisms, such as payment of ecosystem services;

(d) Analysis on the green economy potential of key areas, such as energy, water, oceans and seas, agriculture, forestry, transport, tourism, urban development, and climate change adaptation and mitigation, and on cross-sectoral interlinkages, such as the water-food-energy nexus;

(e) Models for involving businesses and industry in the green economy, including small and medium-sized enterprises, e.g., through public-private partnerships, innovation and technology transfer; and

(f) Indicators for measuring progress towards a green economy.

Annex II

Draft resolution

Observer status for the Global Green Growth Institute in the General Assembly

The General Assembly,

Wishing to promote cooperation between the United Nations and the Global Green Growth Institute,

1. *Decides to invite the Global Green Growth Institute to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;*
 2. *Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to implement the present resolution.*
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